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Per Se Economic Substance 
The economic substance doctrine is used by the IRS and courts to 
distinguish legal tax avoidance from tax evasion. More specifically, execu-
tive and judicial bodies use this doctrine to revoke statutorily compliant 
tax benefits that arise from transactions that lack, beyond such tax bene-
fits, both a subjective business purpose and an objective economic effect. 
The most common tool for measuring the objective economic effect of a 
transaction is the pre-tax profit test. However, disagreement among courts 
and scholars applying this test has led to taxpayer uncertainty and accu-
sations of reverse-engineered opinions. 
In this Comment, I reevaluate and propose an alternative, tiered 
approach to measuring the objective economic effects of a transaction. I 
begin by outlining the origin of the economic substance doctrine, 
including Judge Learned Hand’s insistence that the doctrine balance 
taxpayer certainty with the judicial attempt to ascertain the reality of a 
transaction. With this historico-economic framing in mind, I next evaluate 
three approaches to measuring the objective economic substance of a 
transaction: the predominately used pre-tax profit test as well as two 
leading variations proposed by scholars—Michael Knoll’s implicit tax-
ation regime and Charlene Luke’s comparables test. Because all three of 
these tests, applied on their own, fail to balance taxpayer certainty with 
ascertaining the reality of a transaction, I propose an alternative framework 
for measuring the objective economic substance of a transaction. 
Borrowing from antitrust and corporate law, I suggest a three-stage 
analysis in which certain transactions are subject to a “per se” test, some 
are subject to a “quick look” (or intermediate scrutiny) test, and others 
are subject to a “rule of reason” (or entire fairness) analysis. I argue that 
this tiered analysis will mimic the results of antitrust and corporate law 
by lowering litigation costs and increasing party certainty. Throughout 
this Comment, I use the recent circuit split regarding the inclusion of 
foreign tax expenses in the calculation of pre-tax profit—articulated in 
Bank of New York Mellon Corp. v. Commissioner, 801 F.3d 104, 118 
(2d Cir. 2015)—but my analysis effectively addresses all objective 
economic substance concerns for essentially all scrutinized transactions. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
I know that these monsters are the result of fabulous 
industry and ingenuity, plugging up this hole and casting out 
that net, against all possible evasion; yet at times I cannot help 
recalling a saying of William James about certain passages of 
Hegel: that they were no doubt written with a passion of 
rationality; but that one cannot help wondering whether to 
the reader they have any significance save that the words are 
strung together with syntactical correctness. 
—Judge Learned Hand1 
 
 1. Learned Hand, Thomas Walter Swan, 57 YALE L.J. 167, 169 (1947). 
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Almost no one likes to pay taxes;2 almost everyone does 
whatever they can legally (and cost effectively) to avoid taxes;3 and 
almost no one likes a tax cheat.4 Thus, while most are comfortable 
with others paying only their “fair share,” certain tax avoiders are 
consistently scrutinized by the public for their elaborate tax plan-
ning—most commonly politicians and large businesses.5 
The IRS and courts have been granted the task of distinguishing 
the tax cheat from the tax avoider—a task that has proven difficult 
since the inception of the tax code.6 When accomplished “by means 
 
 2. See 11 Totally Legitimate Reasons to Hate Taxes, HUFFINGTON POST (Apr. 15, 2013), 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/04/15/hate-taxes-reasons-why_n_3084960.html; 
Jonathan Mann, Why Americans Hate Paying Taxes, CNN (Dec. 17, 2010), http://www 
.cnn.com/2010/US/12/17/jonathan.mann.us.taxes/. But see Vanessa Williamson, Americans 
Love Paying Taxes, ATLANTIC (Apr. 15, 2015), http://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive 
/2015/04/americans-love-paying-taxes/390582/. 
 3. See, e.g., Kelly Phillips Erb, Why Romney’s ‘Tax Avoidance’ Strategies Don’t Deserve 
Criticism, FORBES: TAXES (Oct. 30, 2012), http://www.forbes.com/sites/kellyphillipserb/2012 
/10/30/why-romneys-tax-avoidance-strategies-dont-deserve-criticism/#1728ff6c115c; 
Jonah Goldberg, Democrats Are Hypocrites When It Comes to Paying Taxes, L.A. TIMES (Feb. 3, 
2009), http://www.latimes.com/la-oe-goldberg3-2009feb03-column.html; Nomi Prins, When 
It Comes to Taxes, Donald Trump and Hillary Clinton Have 1 Thing in Common, NATION (May 5, 
2016), https://www.thenation.com/article/when-it-comes-to-taxes-donald-trump-and-hil 
lary-clinton-have-one-thing-in-common/. 
 4. See, e.g., Daniel Goleman, The Tax Cheats: Selfish to the Bottom Line, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 
11, 1988), http://www.nytimes.com/1988/04/11/us/the-tax-cheats-selfish-to-the-bottom 
-line.html?pagewanted=all. 
 5. See, e.g., Halimah Abdullah, Obama: Offshore Tax Schemes, Havens Are ‘Gaming the 
System’, NBC NEWS (Apr. 5, 2016), http://www.nbcnews.com/storyline/panama-papers 
/treasury-looks-companies-lowering-tax-rates-moving-abroad-n550936; Jonathan Chew, 7 
Corporate Giants Accused of Evading Billions in Taxes, FORTUNE (Mar. 11, 2016), http://for 
tune.com/2016/03/11/apple-google-taxes-eu/; Max Ehrenfreund, Thanks to Bernie Sanders, 
We Now Know How Many Big Corporations Don’t Pay Taxes, WASH. POST (Apr. 14, 2016), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/wonk/wp/2016/04/14/thanks-to-bernie-sand 
ers-we-now-know-how-many-big-corporations-dont-paytaxes/?utm_term=.02b4b335db69; 
Tim Worstall, Can We Please Get This Straight, Apple and Google Do Not Avoid US Corporate Tax, 
FORBES (Nov. 25, 2013), https://www.forbes.com/sites/timworstall/2013/11/25/can-we 
-please-get-this-straight-apple-and-google-do-not-avoid-us-corporate-tax/#4efa521a57e2. 
 6. See Paul Sullivan, Navigating Between Tax Avoidance and Evasion, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 
11, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/02/12/business/crossing-the-line-between-tax 
-avoidance-and-evasion.html; see also, e.g., Helvering v. Gregory, 69 F.2d 809 (2d Cir. 1934), 
aff’d, 293 U.S. 465 (1935). See generally William Joel Kolarik II & Steven Nicholas John 
Wlodychak, The Economic Substance Doctrine in Federal and State Taxation, 67 TAX LAW. 715 
(2014). In many ways, one might say the IRS finds itself in the seat of a logic student exploring 
counterexamples. That is, the IRS explores the sea of transactions that facially comport with 
the tax code, finds those that are suspect, and inquires, despite their facial comportment with 
the code, whether such comportment defeats the purpose of the code. Tax law appropriately 
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which the law permits,” tax avoidance is an indubitable “legal 
right.”7 Yet, “the law” is not limited to the code itself. Recognizing 
that “[e]ven the smartest drafters of legislation and regulation 
cannot be expected to anticipate every [tax evasive] device”8 and 
that “[a] strictly rule-based tax system cannot efficiently prescribe 
the appropriate outcome of every conceivable transaction that 
might be devised and is, as a result, incapable of preventing all 
unintended consequences,”9 courts have developed multiple tools 
to detect sham transactions used for no other purpose than tax 
evasion.10 The economic substance doctrine (ESD) is one of the most 
prominent of these tools.11 
Generally, the ESD is used by courts to revoke statutorily 
compliant tax benefits arising from transactions that, beyond such 
tax benefits, have no subjective business purpose and no objective 
economic effect.12 Courts and scholars disagree over the details of 
 
lends itself to such logical analysis. See, e.g., P.J. Fitzgerald, Law and Logic, 39 NOTRE DAME 
LAW. 570, 573 (1964) (utilizing a tax law example for logical analysis). 
 7. Gregory v. Helvering, 293 U.S. 465, 469 (1935) (“The legal right of a taxpayer to 
decrease the amount of what otherwise would be his taxes, or altogether avoid them, by 
means which the law permits, cannot be doubted.”). 
 8. ASA Investerings P’ship v. Comm’r, 201 F.3d 505, 513 (D.C. Cir. 2000). 
 9. Bank of N.Y. Mellon Corp. v. Comm’r, 801 F.3d 104, 114 (2d Cir. 2015) (citation omitted). 
 10. Kolarik & Wlodychak, supra note 6, at 760–63 (describing the sham transaction doctrine, 
business purpose doctrine, substance over form doctrine, and step transaction doctrine). 
 11. See id. 
 12. See Frank Lyon Co. v. United States, 435 U.S. 561, 583–84 (1978) (“Where, as here, 
there is a genuine multiple-party transaction with economic substance which is compelled 
or encouraged by business or regulatory realities, is imbued with tax-independent consi-
derations, and is not shaped solely by tax-avoidance features that have meaningless labels 
attached, the Government should honor the allocation of rights and duties effectuated by the 
parties.”); Santander Holdings USA, Inc. v. United States, 844 F.3d 15, 24 (1st Cir. 2016); Bank 
of N.Y. Mellon, 801 F.3d at 115  (“[W]e consider: 1) whether the taxpayer had an objectively 
reasonable expectation of profit, apart from tax benefits, from the transaction; and 2) whether 
the taxpayer has a subjective non-tax purpose in entering the transaction.”); Salem Fin., Inc. 
v. United States, 786 F.3d 932, 950 (Fed. Cir. 2015); Compaq Comput. Corp. v. Comm’r, 277 
F.3d 778, 784 (5th Cir. 2001); IES Indus. v. United States, 253 F.3d 350, 354 (8th Cir. 2001); 
James v. Comm’r, 899 F.2d 905, 908–09 (10th Cir. 1990) (quoting Sochin v. Comm’r, 843 F.2d 
351, 354 (9th Cir. 1988)) (inquiring “whether the transaction had any practical economic 
effects other than the creation of income tax losses”); Rice’s Toyota World, Inc. v. Comm’r, 
752 F.2d 89, 92–94 (4th Cir. 1985) (holding that to treat a transaction as a sham, the court must 
find (1) that the taxpayer was motivated by no business purposes other than obtaining tax 
benefits in entering the transaction and (2) that the transaction has no economic substance 
because no “reasonable possibility” of a profit exists); Joseph Bankman, The Economic Substance 
Doctrine, 74 S. CAL. L. REV. 5, 10–12 (Nov. 2000); Kolarik & Wlodychak, supra note 6, at 721–23, 
750–51. But see ACM P’ship v. Comm’r, 157 F.3d 231, 247 (3d. Cir. 1998) (examining whether 
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the ESD, generally forming four areas of debate. First, when should 
the ESD be applied?13 Second, how should the objective economic 
effects of a transaction be determined?14 Third, what constitutes a 
sufficient subjective business purpose for entering a transaction?15 
And fourth, should the objective and subjective prongs of the ESD 
be applied disjunctively, conjunctively, or balanced as factors in an 
overall inquiry into the economic substance of the transaction?16 
 
the transaction “fell ‘outside the plain intent of the statute’”). See generally Amanda L. Yoder, 
Note, One Prong, Two Prong, Many Prongs: A Look into the Economic Substance Doctrine, 75 MO. 
L. REV. 1409 (2010). But see I.R.C. § 7701(o)(1) (2016) (laying out a conjunctive test for econo-
mic substance, requiring both a subjective business purpose and objective economic effect). 
 13. For example, one of the petitioner’s first arguments in Bank of N.Y. Mellon was that 
the ESD was not applicable to the transaction at issue “because the congressional purpose of 
the foreign tax credits—to prevent double taxation—is clear, [and] a court should never be 
able to question a taxpayer’s use of the credits under the [ESD].” Bank of N.Y. Mellon, 801 F.3d 
at 113. Note that the Second Circuit dismissed this argument, claiming: (1) the argument 
focused on the form of the transaction over the substance; (2) the ESD is intended to provide 
courts with a “‘second look’ to ensure that particular uses of tax benefits comply with 
Congress’s purpose in creating that benefit”; (3) there is no support for the proposition that 
“foreign tax credits, by their nature, are not reviewable for economic substance”; (4) the 
recent codification of the ESD did not create any exemption for foreign tax credits; and (5) the 
IRS specifically stated that Structured Tax Advantaged Repackaged Securities (STARS) 
transactions were to be examined under the ESD. Id. at 113–14. Codification of the ESD left 
open the question to which transactions the ESD was supposed to apply, beginning with the 
statement “in the case of any transaction to which the [ESD] is relevant . . . .” I.R.C. 
§ 7701(o)(1). Some scholars still argue that the doctrine is inapplicable to particular 
transactions, including the recently disputed STARS transactions discussed below. See, e.g., 
Jasper L. Cummings, Jr., The Supreme Court’s Economic Substance Doctrine Opinion, 149 TAX 
NOTES 1295, 1295–97 (Dec. 7, 2015). 
 14. For example, there is currently a circuit split regarding the issue of whether foreign 
tax expenses should be utilized in this determination. Compare Santander, 844 F.3d at 24, and 
Bank of N.Y. Mellon, 801 F.3d at 118, and Salem Fin., 786 F.3d at 950, with Compaq, 277 F.3d at 
784, and IES, 253 F.3d at 354. Further, there remains a larger debate as to what constitutes the 
objective prong. See infra Section III.A.1 for a more in-depth discussion of this debate. 
 15. See Bankman, supra note 12, at 26–29. Note, however, that courts’ analyses of the 
subjective prong of the ESD has been “largely subsumed” by the business purpose doctrine. 
Kolarik & Wlodychak, supra note 6, at 761–62 (citing ACM P’ship, 157 F.3d at 247). Therefore, 
the relevant debate over this prong would likely be found within those debates on the 
substances of the business purpose doctrine. 
 16. See Kolarik & Wlodychak, supra note 6, at 724; Robert Thornton Smith, Business 
Purpose: The Assault upon the Citadel, 53 TAX LAW. 1, 26–27 (1999). The type of test applied is 
potentially dependent upon the court. The Second Circuit explains their application of “the 
test is not a rigid two-step process with discrete prongs; rather, we employ a ‘flexible’ 
analysis where both prongs are factors to consider in the overall inquiry into a transaction’s 
practical economic effects.” Bank of N.Y. Mellon, 801 F.3d at 115. In contrast, the Fifth Circuit 
does not describe its test in detail but utilizes the term “or” when laying out the two prongs. 
Compaq, 277 F.3d at 781 (quoting a disjunctive test as stated in Rice’s Toyota, 752 F.2d at 91). 
Codification appears to have attempted to settle this dispute in favor of a conjunctive test. 
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Given the highly debated nature of each of these questions, it is easy 
to see how a code that is focused on precision and clarity can 
quickly become unwieldy.  
In this Comment, I address the second debate: how should 
courts assess whether a transaction has an objective economic effect 
beyond its tax benefit? Often, courts use the pre-tax profit test to 
make this assessment.17 Yet disagreement persists over how pre-tax 
profit should be measured.18 For example, circuit courts have 
 
First, the statute explicitly uses the term “and” when laying out the two prongs of the test. 
I.R.C. § 7701(o)(1). Second, soon after enactment of the statute, the IRS issued the following 
statement: “The IRS will challenge taxpayers who seek to rely on prior case law under the 
common-law [ESD] for the proposition that a transaction will be treated as having economic 
substance merely because it satisfies either section 7701(o)(1)(A) [the objective prong,] . . . or 
7701(o)(1)(B) [the business purpose prong].” I.R.S. Notice 2010-62, Interim Guidance Under the 
Codification of the Economic Substance Doctrine and Related Provisions in the Health Care and 
Education Reconciliation Act of 2010, I.R.B. 2010-40 (Oct. 4, 2010), https://www.irs.gov/irb 
/2010-40_IRB. Yet it remains highly questionable whether this interpretation makes eco-
nomic sense. As pointed out by the Second Circuit, as well as numerous commentators, there 
are plenty of situations in which a business may not earn some minimum profit to justify an 
economic reality but may still be worthy of the foreign tax credit given its strong subjective 
purpose. Salem Fin., 786 F.3d at 949–50 (citing Daniel N. Shaviro & David A. Weisbach, The 
Fifth Circuit Gets It Wrong in Compaq v. Commissioner, 94 TAX NOTES 511, 515 (2002)). See 
generally Terrance O’Reilly, Economics & Economic Substance, 9 FLA. TAX REV. 755 (2010); 
Smith, supra note 16, at 26–27. 
 17. See, e.g., Santander, 844 F.3d at 23–24; Bank of N.Y. Mellon, 801 F.3d at 115; Salem 
Fin., 786 F.3d at 950; Compaq, 277 F.3d at 784; Shriver v. Comm’r, 889 F.2d 724, 725–26 (8th 
Cir. 1990); Rice’s Toyota, 752 F.2d at 91. It is also worth noting that the pre-tax profit test was 
adopted in the recent codification of the economic substance doctrine. I.R.C. § 7701(o)(2)(A) 
(“The potential for profit of a transaction shall be taken into account in determining whether 
the requirements of subparagraphs (A) and (B) of paragraph (1) are met with respect to the 
transaction only if the present value of the reasonably expected pre-tax profit from the 
transaction is substantial in relation to the present value of the expected net tax benefits that 
would be allowed if the transaction were respected.”). But see O’Reilly, supra note 16, at 792 
(claiming that section 7701(o) only “refers to a ‘meaningful’ change in economic position, 
and suggests that pretax profit is not the only indication of such a change”). While section 
7701(o) does not replace the common law ESD, to learn more about the details regarding its 
adoption and implications the reader should see generally Jerald David August, The 
Codification of the Economic Substance Doctrine, Part I, BUS. ENTITIES, Sept.–Oct. 2010, at 4; Jerald 
David August, The Codification of the Economic Substance Doctrine, Part II, BUS. ENTITIES, Nov.–
Dec. 2010, at 4; Richard M. Lipton, ‘Codification’ of the Economic Substance Doctrine—Much Ado 
About Nothing?, 112 J. TAX’N 325 (2010); Charlene D. Luke, The Relevance Games: Congress’s 
Choices for Economic Substance Gamemakers, 66 TAX LAW. 551 (2013). 
 18. See Bankman, supra note 12, at 23–26; David P. Hariton, The Compaq Case, Notice 98-
5, and Tax Shelters: The Theory Is All Wrong, 94 TAX NOTES 501, 513 (2002); Richard M. Lipton, 
The Stars Are Not Aligned: Courts Split in Assessing an Alleged Tax Shelter Transaction, 120 J. 
TAX’N 32, 32 (2014); Shannon Weeks McCormack, Tax Shelters and Statutory Interpretation: A 
Much Needed Purposive Approach, 2009 U. ILL. L. REV. 697, 709–14 (2009). 
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recently split on how foreign tax expenses should be included in 
this calculation.19 Likewise, courts and scholars dispute the 
boundaries of a suspect transaction as well as how much pre-tax 
profit is sufficient to demonstrate an objective economic effect.20 
The unsettled nature of  these disputes entails taxpayer uncertainty 
and accusations of reverse-engineered decisions.21 
On a more theoretical level, scholars often question the under-
lying assumption of the pre-tax profit test, namely that “the 
economics of a transaction are readily separable from its tax 
components,” and have demonstrated that this assumption can 
often lead to inaccurate results.22 Thus, variations on, and alter-
natives to, the pre-tax profit test have been proposed by various 
scholars in this field. 
The leading two alternatives are Michael Knoll’s variation on 
the pre-tax profit test that takes into account implicit taxes23 and 
Charlene Luke’s proposal to look beyond the pre-tax profit cal-
culation and assess the objective economic substance of a suspect 
transaction by examining its risk and after-tax return in comparison 
to other transactions.24 Both of these alternatives have the 
 
 19. Compare Santander, 844 F.3d at 23–24, and Bank of N.Y. Mellon, 801 F.3d at 118, and 
Salem Fin., 786 F.3d at 950 (holding that foreign tax expenses should be included in the 
calculation of pre-tax profit), with Compaq, 277 F.3d at 784, and IES, 253 F.3d at 354 (holding 
that foreign tax expenses should be excluded from the calculation of pre-tax profit). See also 
Lipton, supra note 18, at 34. 
 20. See Bankman, supra note 12, at 12–26. 
 21. That is, that the courts will essentially use the doctrine to strike down the tax 
benefits of transactions they simply do not like. See, e.g., Cummings, supra note 13, at 1295, 
1299, 1303 (alleging that the Second Circuit, in its recent opinion, exercised “license to turn 
every code section into a search for a congressional purpose” in order to criticize a tax 
structure it simply didn’t like); Jasper L. Cummings, Jr., Economic Substance Doctrine Defense 
Plan, 130 TAX NOTES 953 (Feb. 21, 2011); Jasper L. Cummings, Jr., Circular Cash Flows and the 
Federal Income Tax, 64 TAX LAW. 535, 634 (2011); Lipton, supra note 18, at 32. 
 22. Charlene D. Luke, Risk, Return, and Objective Economic Substance, 27 VA. TAX REV. 
783, 798 (2008); see also Michael S. Knoll, Compaq Redux: Implicit Taxes and the Question of Pre-
Tax Profit, 26 VA. TAX REV. 821, 834–35 (2007). 
 23. See generally Knoll, supra note 22. 
 24. See generally Luke, supra note 22. Luke’s proposal may be said to be an extension 
of David P. Hariton, When and How Should the Economic Substance Doctrine Be Applied?, 60 TAX 
L. REV. 29, 53–54 (2006) (looking specifically at the “unique economic risk” of a transaction). 
But see O’Reilly, supra note 16, at 792 (contrasting Hariton’s test, examining “whether the 
taxpayer incurs unique economic risk by entering into the transaction that is itself substantial 
in relation to the amount of tax benefits in question,” with Luke’s test, examining “whether 
the after-tax return on the suspect transaction [is] substantially higher than the return on 
economically comparable market transactions” (alteration in original) (citations omitted)). 
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advantage of accounting for complexities that remain uncaptured 
by the pre-tax profit test. Unfortunately, however, both have the 
disadvantage of increasing taxpayer uncertainty by creating more 
variables and relying on sophisticated market analyses.25  
I believe a solution to this problem comes from the tiered 
analyses of corporate and antitrust law. Both fields have been 
developed to increase litigation certainty while accommodating 
numerous variables and sophisticated analyses.26 This was (and is) 
done by creating a tiered analysis that deals with some situations 
using a per se rule and others with more fairness-style analyses. 
While the structure and fluidity of antitrust law may typically be 
considered antithetical to the rigidity of the tax code,27 I believe the 
taxpayers and courts would benefit from a similarly tiered frame-
work for applying the ESD.  
Borrowing from these fields of law, I suggest a three-stage 
analysis to assess the objective economic substance of a transaction. 
First, I suggest a simplified version of the pre-tax profit test be 
applied to all suspect transactions to determine whether they per se 
satisfy, or per se fail to satisfy, the objective economic substance 
prong. Should a suspect transaction not fit within these per se 
boundaries, a “quick look” test applying Knoll’s implicit taxation 
regime should be used to determine the likelihood of a pre-tax 
profit. Finally, should the transaction fail to qualify for the “quick 
look” analysis, Luke’s comparables test should apply in a manner 
similar to the “rule of reason” analysis in antitrust law—allowing 
courts full freedom to assess the fairness of unusual, unique 
transactions. As explained below, this framework would increase 
taxpayer certainty in a manner similar to the manner in which the 
per se/fairness framework has increased litigation certainty within 
antitrust and corporate law.28  
I will proceed as follows. In Part II, I provide a brief history of 
the development of the ESD, highlighting Judge Learned Hand’s 
 
 25. See infra Sections III.B, C. Further, Luke’s comparables test would likely lead tax 
courts to a situation similar to Seventh Amendment judge or jury cases, where courts are left 
to simply pick between similarly analogous transactions. See infra Section III.C. 
 26. See infra Part IV. 
 27. See Frank H. Easterbrook, Judicial Discretion in Statutory Interpretation, 57 OKLA. L. 
REV. 1, 6–7 (2004). 
 28. See infra Part IV. 
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concern for balancing taxpayer certainty against a highly 
deterministic tax code’s “self-defeating” nature. In Part III, I discuss 
the current circuit split regarding how to allocate foreign tax ex-
penses29 within the pre-tax profit test as well as general criticisms 
of the test. I then turn to Knoll’s implicit taxation regime and 
Charlene Luke’s comparables test and discuss how each accounts 
for missing components of the pre-tax profit test, but also how each 
fails to resolve the problem of taxpayer uncertainty. Finally, in Part 
IV, borrowing from antitrust and corporate law, I propose a 
framework for determining objective economic substance that 
would increase taxpayer certainty while accounting for the weak-
nesses of the pre-tax profit test. 
II. A BRIEF HISTORY OF THE ECONOMIC SUBSTANCE DOCTRINE: 
JUDGE HAND’S COMPETING CONCERNS 
In 1928, certain shareholders of the Monitor Securities 
Corporation were sitting pretty; Monitor stock had appreciated 
considerably, and those shareholders who bought low had an 
opportunity to sell high.30 United Mortgage Corporation was one 
such shareholder.31 Yet its sole owner, Mrs. Gregory, had a 
problem: if she had United directly sell the shares, United would 
owe significant taxes on the profits from the sale, and Gregory 
would be required to pay additional taxes on any dividends United 
paid to her.32 Thus, Gregory devised a plan: incorporate a new 
Delaware corporation, Averill, and have United transfer the 
Monitor shares to it.33 Three days later, Gregory liquidated Averill, 
received the Monitor shares in the liquidation, and promptly 
sold them.34 
Gregory paid only modest taxes on the sale of the Monitor 
shares, offsetting her gains by utilizing a special benefit in the tax 
code for shares that are “distributed, in pursuance of a plan of 
 
 29. See supra note 19. 
 30. See Gregory v. Helvering, 293 U.S. 465, 467 (1935). 
 31. Id. 
 32. Helvering v. Gregory, 69 F.2d 809, 810 (2d Cir. 1934), aff’d, 293 U.S. 465 (1935). 
 33. Id. 
 34. Id. 
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reorganization.”35 The Commissioner objected to Gregory’s 
characterization of the transaction as a “reorganization,” but the 
Board of Tax Appeals upheld the tax benefit as deriving from 
“real” transactions.36 The Second Circuit heard Gregory’s appeal, 
and writing for the majority, Judge Learned Hand acknowledged 
the reality of Gregory’s transactions as well as a taxpayer’s right 
to lower her taxes as much as possible.37 Yet Judge Hand held that 
a corporate “reorganization” that failed to realize any profit, 
except “[t]o dodge the shareholders’ taxes,” was inconsistent with 
the history and purpose of the statute defining the term.38 The 
Supreme Court affirmed Judge Hand’s opinion, and thus, the ESD 
was conceived.39 
Over the next twenty years, Judge Hand became frustrated with 
the broad use of purposive statutory interpretation within the ESD 
as other judges struck down transactions Judge Hand felt had a 
business purpose.40 For example, Judge Hand chided Judge 
Arundell and the Supreme Court in an internal memorandum 
regarding a later tax avoidance case, stating: 
I have a feeling in my bones that the Supreme Court would 
support this tax saying that the transaction was a “sham” and 
letting it go at that. . . . We shall never get any order in this subject 
if we rest in the word “sham” or in such meaningless chatter as 
that of Arundell here.41 
Judge Hand understood that purposive statutory interpretation 
did not adequately balance “the taxpayer’s need for certainty and 
the self-defeating rationale” of strict reliance on the code.42 That is, 
 
 35. Id. 
 36. Id. 
 37. Id. 
 38. Id. at 811. 
 39. Gregory v. Helvering, 293 U.S. 465, 468–70 (1935). Note that most historians 
attribute the actual formation of the ESD to Gilbert v. Commissioner, 248 F.2d 399, 412 (2d 
Cir. 1957) (Hand, J., dissenting). See Kolarik & Wlodychak, supra note 6, at 725–44. 
 40. Kolarik & Wlodychak, supra note 6, at 733–35 (describing Judge Hand’s reasoning 
and opinion in Chisholm v. Comm’r, 79 F.2d 14 (2d Cir. 1935)). 
 41. Id. at 734 (quoting Learned Hand Memorandum, Hand Papers, File No. 194-10 (on 
file with the Harvard Law School Library)). 
 42. Id. at 742. 
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left unchecked, purposive statutory interpretation could lead to 
unpredictable, reverse-engineered opinions.43 
Thus, dissenting in his final tax avoidance case, Judge Hand 
proposed an alternative test that avoided purposive statutory inter-
pretation.44 In Gilbert, a generally unsuccessful company often 
received additional investments from one of its shareholders 
(Gilbert), and his wife, “that were structured as loans.”45 When the 
company liquidated, Gilbert and his wife accordingly “claimed bad 
debt deductions on their 1948 joint income tax return.”46 Yet the Tax 
Court found that the transactions were not “bona fide loans” and, 
thereby, struck the bad debt deductions.47 
On appeal, the majority remanded the case back to the Tax 
Court to determine whether the investments satisfied the court’s 
sua sponte definition of “debt.”48 Judge Hand, however, argued that 
the term “debt” was clear from precedent.49 Thus, instead of resting 
the case on the meaning of a term, Judge Hand proposed the 
following question: “When the petitioners decided to make their 
advances in the form of debts, rather than capital advances, did 
they suppose that the difference would appreciably affect their 
beneficial interests in the venture, other than taxwise?”50 This 
question focused the inquiry of the ESD on the economic effects of 
the transaction, rather than the purpose of the statute providing the 
tax benefit.51 
 
 43. Id. 
 44. Gilbert, 248 F.2d at 412 (Hand, J., dissenting). 
 45. Kolarik & Wlodychak, supra note 6, at 736. 
 46. Id. 
 47. Gilbert, 248 F.2d at 402. 
 48. Id. at 406 (requiring that the “funds were advanced with reasonable expectations 
of repayment” in order to constitute “debt”). 
 49. Id. at 410–11 (Hand, J., dissenting). 
 50. Id. at 412 (citations omitted). Kolarik & Wlodychak summarize Judge Hand’s rule 
as follows: “[W]hen [a] taxpayer could have accomplished the same goals through an 
alternative transaction, [a] taxpayer must show an ‘appreciable economic effect beyond the 
tax consequences.’” Kolarik & Wlodychak, supra note 6, at 749 (quoting Gilbert, 248 F.2d at 
412 (Hand, J., dissenting)). 
 51. Stated another way, Judge Hand’s test presumes that the purpose of any statute 
providing a tax benefit for a particular transaction is that the transaction have some economic 
effect outside of the tax benefit. 
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Three years after Gilbert, the Supreme Court adopted Judge 
Hand’s proposal, quoting directly from his dissent.52 Further, in 
Knetsch, the Supreme Court implicitly separated the subjective 
business purpose and objective economic effects inquiries, 
applying a rudimentary version of the pre-tax profit test.53 The 
inquiries would later be formally separated in Frank Lyon,54 the last 
case in which the Supreme Court applied the ESD. This dearth of 
any word from the Supreme Court, despite clear inconsistencies 
among the circuit courts, reinforces the difficult task faced by courts 
applying the ESD. In the end, Judge Hand’s attempt to balance 
“taxpayer certainty” against a highly deterministic code’s “self-
defeating” nature resulted in a test that has focused on the objective 
economic effects of the transaction.55 In Part III, I articulate the 
various tests applied by courts and proposed by scholars and 
analyze whether they adequately accomplish the balance sought by 
Judge Hand. 
III. APPROACHES TO ASSESSING OBJECTIVE ECONOMIC SUBSTANCE 
Generally, most courts apply some variation of the pre-tax 
profit test to assess the objective economic substance of a trans-
action.56 That said, debates among courts and scholars continue to 
 
 52. Knetsch v. United States, 364 U.S. 361, 366 (1960). Quoting Judge Hand in the 
Court’s holding, Justice Brennan states, “Knetsch’s transaction with the insurance company 
did ‘not appreciably affect his beneficial interest except to reduce his tax.’” Id. 
 53. Kolarik & Wlodychak, supra note 6, at 745–46; see Knetsch, 364 U.S. at 364, 366. 
 54. Rice’s Toyota World, Inc. v. Comm’r, 752 F.2d 89, 91 (4th Cir. 1985) (holding that 
Frank Lyon required a “two-pronged inquiry to determine whether a transaction is, for tax 
purposes, a sham” and that “[t]o treat a transaction as a sham, the court must find [(1)] that 
the taxpayer was motivated by no business purposes other than obtaining tax benefits in 
entering the transaction, and [(2)] that the transaction has no economic substance because no 
reasonable possibility of a profit exists”); see Frank Lyon Co. v. United States, 435 U.S. 561, 
583–84 (1978) (“[W]here, as here, there is a genuine multiple-party transaction with economic 
substance which is compelled or encouraged by business or regulatory realities, is imbued 
with tax-independent considerations, and is not shaped solely by tax-avoidance features that 
have meaningless labels attached, the Government should honor the allocation of rights and 
duties effectuated by the parties.”). But see Kolarik & Wlodychak, supra note 6, at 750 (“Frank 
Lyon is similar to the methodology developed by Judge Hand in Gilbert and adopted and 
extrapolated upon by the . . . Supreme Court in Knetsch,” and thus, “[f]rom that perspec-
tive, . . . adds little to the evolution of the judicial doctrines that stem from Gregory.”). 
 55. See supra text accompanying note 42. 
 56. See supra note 17. The Federal, First, and Second Circuits have facially diverged 
from solely relying on pre-tax profit, holding that the objective prong determination 
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flourish regarding the measurement of pre-tax profit as well as the 
accuracy of the test based on its underlying assumptions.57 This has 
led to taxpayer uncertainty and accusations of reverse-engineered 
opinions.58 In response, scholars have proposed variations on, and 
replacements to, the objective economic substance inquiry—the 
leading two of which are Knoll’s implicit taxation regime and 
Luke’s comparables test.59 As argued below, while both of these 
proposals account for nuances uncaptured by the pre-tax profit test, 
both fail to fully consider the effects on taxpayer certainty as 
emphasized by Judge Hand. 
 
“requires both a calculation of pre-tax profit and a consideration of the transaction’s overall 
economic effect.” Bank of N.Y. Mellon Corp. v. Comm’r, 801 F.3d 104, 119 (2d Cir. 2015) 
(“The objective economic substance inquiry . . . does not end at profit, as a legitimate 
transaction could conceivably lack economic profit. The Supreme Court has indeed 
cautioned: ‘There is no simple device available to peel away the form of [a] transaction and 
to reveal its substance.’ A court should also look to the overall economic effect of the 
transaction in determining objective economic substance. In conducting this inquiry, we 
agree with the Tax Court that ‘[e]conomic benefits that would result independent of a 
transaction do not constitute a non-tax benefit for purposes of testing its economic 
substance.’” (citations omitted)); Santander Holdings USA, Inc. v. United States, 844 F.3d 15, 
23–24 (1st Cir. 2016); Salem Fin., Inc. v. United States, 786 F.3d 932, 950 (Fed. 2015). Yet it 
remains unclear what is meant by “overall economic effect” beyond either a pre-tax profit or 
a subjective business purpose. That is, these circuits point to transactions involving “nascent 
technologies” as examples of transactions that may lack pre-tax profit but likely have an 
economic effect beyond tax purposes. See Bank of N.Y. Mellon, 801 F.3d at 119 (quoting Salem 
Fin., 786 F.3d at 950) (“Transactions involving nascent technologies, for instance, often do 
not turn a profit in the early years unless tax benefits are accounted for. To brand such 
transactions as a sham simply because they are unprofitable before tax benefits are taken into 
account would be contrary to the clear intent of Congress.”). Yet transactions involving 
“nascent technologies” would likely satisfy the subjective prong of the ESD, examining the 
“business purpose” of the transaction, and are therefore justified without producing some 
type of pre-tax profit. That is, I find the “nascent technologies” argument to more 
significantly weigh for disjunctive, and against conjunctive, versions of the ESD; c.f. 
discussion of conjunctive/disjunctive debate, supra note 16. Some other circuits have 
refrained from distinguishing between the objective and subjective prongs of the ESD, asking 
the general question of “whether the transaction had any practical economic effects other 
than the creation of income tax losses.” James v. Comm’r, 899 F.2d 905, 908–09 (10th Cir. 
1990) (quoting Sochin v. Comm’r, 843 F.2d 351, 354 (9th Cir. 1988)). Yet, in examining the 
“practical economic effects” of a transaction, these circuits will typically include an exam-
ination of either a business purpose or a demonstration of pre-tax profit. See James, 899 F.2d 
at 907–10; Sochin, 843 F.2d at 353–56. Thus, courts applying the ESD almost universally rely 
on some version of the pre-tax profit test. 
 57. See supra notes 18–20. 
 58. See supra note 21. 
 59. See supra notes 23–24. 
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A. The Pre-tax Profit Test 
Generally, the pre-tax profit test recognizes that a transaction 
that results in an appreciable60 profit to the taxpayer, beyond its tax 
benefits, has objective economic substance.61 This test is often 
criticized for three reasons: (1) it is unclear how pre-tax profit 
should be measured;62 (2) it is unclear how much pre-tax profit is 
necessary to satisfy the test;63 and (3) it assumes “the economics of 
a transaction are readily separable from its tax components,” 
leading to inaccurate conclusions.64 I describe and address each of 
these criticisms below. 
1. Measuring pre-tax profit 
Measuring the pre-tax profit of a transaction is essentially a task 
of defining transaction boundaries.65 Courts have generally taken a 
practical approach to this task,66 “taking into account factors such 
as chronology, formal and informal agreements, and relationships 
among the parties.”67 If a particular transaction fits relatively well 
with other sets of transactions that are part of the regular business 
operations of the company, courts are more likely to link the two.68 
Yet if that particular transaction appears to be simply an unrelated 
investment, it is unlikely to be linked to any other transaction.69 
 
 60. There is considerable debate over what constitutes “appreciable,” as described 
below in criticisms of the pre-tax profit test. See Luke, supra note 22, at 794–96. One 
articulation was given by the Tax Court, finding a “de minimis gain” insufficient. Sheldon v. 
Comm’r, 94 T.C. 738, 767 (1990). For a more in-depth discussion, see supra Section III.A.1. 
 61. See Luke, supra note 22, at 793 (“[T]he pre-tax profit viewpoint requires courts to 
consider not only actual pre-tax profit but pre-tax profit potential.”). 
 62. See supra note 18. 
 63. See Luke, supra note 22, at 795–97; see also Bankman, supra note 12, at 23–26. 
 64. Luke, supra note 22, at 798; see also Knoll, supra note 22, 834–35. 
 65. See Bankman, supra note 12, at 15 (commenting that the broader the boundaries of 
the transaction, the more likely non-tax attributes will be found within it). 
 66. See id. at 18–20. 
 67. Luke, supra note 22, at 806–07 (“Financing and hedging arrangements that are 
directly implicated by such factors should be considered part of the suspect transaction. 
Hedging and financing unrelated to the transaction should not be taken into account, 
although these agreements may well have some bearing on the actual risks and profitability 
of the suspect transaction.” (footnote omitted)). 
 68. Bankman, supra note 12, at 18–20. 
 69. Id. 
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Further, there are clear divides regarding what courts are to 
include in the calculation of pre-tax profit. For example, the Second 
Circuit recently articulated its split with the Fifth and Eighth 
Circuits, holding that foreign tax expenses should be included in 
the pre-tax profit calculation when foreign tax credits are at issue.70 
I summarize both Compaq and Bank of New York Mellon, two cases 
that are representative of this split, below. The debate between 
these two cases provides a foundation for my proposed framework 
in Part IV. 
In 1992, Compaq sold some of its investment stock, recognizing 
a significant long-term capital gain of more than $230 million.71 
Soon thereafter, Compaq was contacted by Twenty-First Securities 
Corporation (Twenty-First) with a proposed transaction to offset this 
gain.72 The proposed transaction was relatively simple: (1) pur-
chase Royal Dutch Petroleum Company (Royal Dutch) American 
Depository Receipts (ADRs),73 cum dividend;74 (2) collect the 
dividend; and (3) sell the Royal Dutch ADRs, ex dividend.75 Figure 
1 diagrams this transaction. 
 
 70. Bank of N.Y. Mellon Corp. v. Comm’r, 801 F.3d 104, 118 (2d Cir. 2015). 
 71. Compaq Comput. Corp. & Subsidiaries v. Comm’r, 113 T.C. 214, 215 (1999), rev’d, 
277 F.3d 778 (5th Cir. 2001). Note that the transaction at issue in this case was substantially 
similar to that in IES Indus., Inc. v. United States, 253 F.3d 350 (8th Cir. 2001); therefore, I 
only present the facts from Compaq. 
 72. Compaq, 113 T.C. at 215. 
 73. As explained by the Tax Court, 
An ADR . . . is a trading unit issued by a trust, which represents ownership of stock 
in a foreign corporation that is deposited with the trust. ADR’s [sic] are the 
customary form of trading foreign stocks on U.S. stock exchanges . . . . The ADR 
transaction involves the purchase of ADR’s “cum dividend”, [sic] followed by the 
immediate resale of the same ADR’s “ex dividend”. [sic] 
Id. 
 74. “‘Cum dividend’ refers to a purchase or sale of . . . an ADR share with the 
purchaser entitled to a declared dividend.” Id. at 215–16. 
 75. “‘Ex dividend’ refers to the purchase or sale of . . . an ADR share without the 
entitlement to a declared dividend.” Id. at 216. 
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Figure 1. Compaq Royal Dutch ADRs Transaction 
 
Compaq rapidly executed this transaction twenty-three times 
within approximately one hour.76 “The aggregate purchase price 
was” approximately $887.6 million, “cum dividend.”77 In total, the 
“blended price per share equaled the actual market price plus the 
net dividend.”78 “[T]he aggregate sales price was” approximately 
$868.4 million, “ex dividend.”79 Trades were only executed “if the 
prices . . . were within the range of the current market prices.”80 The 
fees for the purchase were approximately $1.5 million.81 After the 
sale, Compaq reported a capital loss of $20.7 million.82 Compaq’s 
gross dividend was approximately $22.5 million; however, ap-
proximately $3.4 million was withheld for Netherlands tax, leaving 
Compaq with approximately $19.2 million net dividend.83 
 
 76. Id. at 217–18. 
 77. Id. at 217. 
 78. Id. 
 79. Id. 
 80. Id. at 218. 
 81. Id. 
 82. Id. at 219. 





























Pays fee to Broker
$1.5m
BrokerPays fee to
4.HOUCHENS_FIN_NOHEADER.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 8/17/18  10:40 AM 
157 Per Se Economic Substance 
 173 
Compaq “claimed a foreign tax credit of” approximately $3.4 
million “for the income tax withheld and paid to the Netherlands 
Government.”84 The Commissioner challenged the availability of 
the foreign tax credit to Compaq because Compaq failed to demon-
strate the underlying transaction had any economic substance.85 
That is, the Commissioner argued that Compaq’s foreign tax ex-
penses should be included in the calculation of its pre-tax profit.86 
Thus, taking the difference between its net dividend and its capital 
loss under the Commissioner’s view, Compaq had no pre-tax profit 
and simply suffered a loss of $1.5 million.87 Compaq responded that 
its foreign tax expenses should not be included in the calculation of 
its pre-tax profit.88 Under such a rule, Compaq’s pre-tax profit 
would be the difference between its gross dividend and its capital 
loss, approximately $1.9 million.89 The Tax Court rejected Compaq’s 
argument,90 but the Fifth Circuit reversed, holding that foreign tax 
expenses should not be included in the pre-tax profit calculation.91 
Both the Fifth and Eighth Circuits justified this holding under 
the common law principle that “[t]he discharge by a third person 
of an obligation to him is equivalent to receipt by the person 
taxed.”92 That is, the withholding of foreign tax was “no different 
from an employer withholding and paying to the government 
income taxes for an employee.”93 In addition, the Fifth Circuit 
further reasoned that “[i]f the effects of tax law, domestic or foreign, 
are to be accounted for when they subtract from a transaction’s net 
cash flow, tax law effects should be counted when they add to cash 
flow.”94 That is, “[t]o be consistent, the analysis should either count 
all tax law effects or not count any of them.”95 
 
 84. Compaq, 113 T.C. at 219. 
 85. See id. at 220. 
 86. Id. at 222–23. 
 87. Id. 
 88. Id. at 221–22. 
 89. Id. 
 90. Id. at 222. 
 91. Compaq Comput. Corp. & Subsidiaries v. Comm’r, 277 F.3d 778, 784–87 (5th 
Cir. 2001). 
 92. Old Colony Tr. Co. v. Comm’r, 279 U.S. 716, 729 (1929). 
 93. IES Indus., Inc. v. United States, 253 F.3d 350, 354 (8th Cir. 2001); see Compaq, 277 
F.3d at 783. 
 94. Compaq, 277 F.3d at 785. 
 95. Id. 
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Yet, fifteen years later, the Federal, First, and Second Circuits 
have held—contrary to the Fifth and Eighth Circuits—that foreign 
tax expenses should be included in the pre-tax profit calculation.96 
Before providing the reasoning of these circuits, I summarize the 
facts involved in the transaction at issue in Bank of New York Mellon.97 
In 2001, the Bank of New York Mellon (BNY)98 was contacted 
by Barclays Bank (Barclays), and entered into a highly complex 
“Structured Trust Advantaged Repackaged Securities” (STARS) 
transaction.99 There were essentially five steps to structuring the 
STARS transaction: (1) “BNY contributed $6.46 billion of assets” to 
Real Estate Investment Trust (REIT) Holdings; (2) BNY then 
organized an InvestCo, and REIT Holdings invested the BNY assets 
as well as additional real estate holdings in exchange for 100% 
ownership of InvestCo and the InvestCo’s assumption of all REIT 
Holdings’ liabilities; (3) BNY organized a DelCo and the InvestCo  
capitalized the DelCo with almost all of the InvestCo’s assets in 
exchange for preferred shares; (4) BNY then formed a trust, 
registered in London and managed in New York, that issued four 
classes of preferred shares and received investments in assets and 
shares from both the InvestCo and the DelCo; and, finally, (5) BNY 
organized a NewCo with the InvestCo as its sole owner.100 “In sum, 
the above steps moved approximately $7.86 billion in net assets into 
DelCo and the trust.”101 
By registering the trust in the United Kingdom instead of the 
United States, “the trust’s income [was] subject to U.K. taxation.”102 
In exchange, “Barclays agreed to pay BNY a monthly amount equal 
to half of the U.K. taxes BNY expected to pay on the trust’s 
 
 96. Bank of N.Y. Mellon Corp. v. Comm’r, 801 F.3d 104, 118 (2d Cir. 2015). The Federal 
and First Circuits have agreed with the Second Circuit. See Santander Holdings USA, Inc. v. 
United States, 844 F.3d 15, 19 (1st Cir. 2016); Salem Fin., Inc. v. United States, 786 F.3d 932, 
950 (Fed. Cir. 2015). 
 97. Because all three circuits were dealing with similar STARS transactions, I limit my 
exposition to simply the facts of Bank of New York Mellon to avoid redundancy. 
 98. At the time, the Bank of New York Mellon was the Mellon Financial Corporation. 
Bank of N.Y. Mellon Corp. v. Comm’r, 140 T.C. 15, 16–17 (2013), aff’d, 801 F.3d 104 (2d 
Cir. 2015). 
 99. Id. 
 100. Id. at 18–20. 
 101. Id. at 20. See Appendix (Diagram A) for a diagram used by the Tax Court to describe 
the structure of the STARS transaction.  
 102. Bank of N.Y. Mellon, 801 F.3d at 110. 
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income.”103 Barclays “purchased shares in the trust . . . for $1.5 
billion, effectively making a loan in that amount to BNY for the 
duration of STARS through the trust structure.”104 “BNY [would] 
repay the loan by purchasing Barclay’s trust units for approx-
imately $1.5 billion at the end of five years” with a “monthly 
interest rate . . . equal to one-month LIBOR plus 30 basis points, 
minus the aforementioned monthly tax-spread.”105 As the Second 
Circuit summarized: 
Throughout the five-year duration of the STARS transactions, the 
trust made monthly distributions of income via a circular, multi-
step process. First, BNY distributed funds from its income-
earning assets to the trust, and the trust set aside 22% of its income 
to pay U.K. taxes. With most of the remaining income, the trust 
made monthly . . . distributions to a Barclays account that was 
“blocked,” meaning Barclays could not access the funds or control 
the account. Barclays immediately returned these distributions to 
the trust each month, and the trust then distributed the funds to 
BNY, beginning the cycle again.106 
To clarify this transaction, the Federal Circuit provides the 
following hypothetical that traces “$100 of trust income through the 
distribution cycle.”107 
The Trust income was subject to U.K. taxation at a 22 percent rate. 
Therefore, $22 for every $100 of Trust income was set aside for 
payment of the U.K. taxes, leaving the Trust with $78 after the 
U.K. tax payment. Because of its nominal equity interest in the 
Trust, Barclays was also taxed on the Trust income under U.K. law 
at a corporate tax rate of 30 percent, or $30 for every $100 of Trust 
income. Barclays, however, was able to claim a $22 U.K. tax credit 
for the $22 of tax paid by the Trust as an “imputation credit” that 
partially offset the higher corporate tax imposed on the Trust’s 
distributions. As a result, Barclays effectively paid $8 in U.K. tax. 
 The Trust distributed the after-tax amount of $78 of Trust 
income to the Barclays Blocked Account, from which that sum 
was immediately re-contributed to the Trust. Under U.K. law, 
 
 103. Id. 
 104. Id. 
 105. Id. at 110–11. 
 106. Id. at 111. 
 107. Id. 
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Barclays was able to treat the re-contributed $78 as a “trading 
loss,” thereby claiming a trading loss deduction. At the 30 percent 
tax rate, that deduction was worth $23.40. Barclays’ $8 U.K. tax 
liability was then completely offset by the $23.40 tax deduction, 
leaving Barclays with a net tax benefit of $15.40. 
 In the example, the Bx payment that Barclays paid to [the 
plaintiff], which was predetermined to be equal to 51 percent of 
the Trust’s U.K. tax payments, would be approximately $11. 
Barclays would then deduct the $11 Bx payment from its U.K. 
corporate taxes, which at the 30 percent tax rate yielded another 
tax benefit worth $3.30. The net benefit to Barclays, for every 
$100 in Trust income, was thus $7.70, based on U.K. tax credits 
and deductions . . . . 
 For its part, [the plaintiff], having paid the $22 U.K. tax on the 
Trust income, would claim a foreign tax credit of $22 for the entire 
amount of the Trust’s U.K. taxes. However, having received the 
$11 Bx payment from Barclays, [the plaintiff] would have a net 
gain of $11.108 
Figure 2 diagrams this tracing of $100.109 
 
 
 108. Salem Fin., Inc. v. United States, 786 F.3d 932, 938 (Fed. Cir. 2015). 
 109. For a more complete discussion with a corresponding diagram of the transaction, 
see generally Bank of N.Y. Mellon Corp. v. Commissioner, 140 T.C. 15, 18–20 (2013). 
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 Figure 2. Simplified Version of the STARS Transaction 
 
Once again, the Commissioner argued that foreign taxes should 
be included in the calculation of pre-tax profit, and the Tax Court 
accepted this argument, despite the Fifth and Eighth Circuits’ 
holdings.110 Applying the hypothetical above, “for every $100 of 
trust income, [BNY] incurred $22 of foreign tax expense and only 
$11 in income,” resulting in “an $11 net loss”111 and, therefore, a 
pre-tax loss. BNY appealed, arguing that the Second Circuit should 
adopt the holding of the Fifth and Eighth Circuits and exclude 
foreign tax expenses from the pre-tax profit calculation.112 Doing 
otherwise, BNY argued, would “‘fictionalize[]’ the transactions, 
including the costs . . . but not the corresponding income.”113 Yet 
the Second Circuit rejected BNY’s argument and affirmed the 
holding of the Tax Court for two reasons.114 First, relying on the Tax 
Court’s analysis, the Second Circuit considered foreign taxes to be 
“the same as any other transaction cost.”115 Second, “excluding the 
 
 110. Id. at 35 n.9. 
 111. Bank of N.Y. Mellon, 801 F.3d at 116. 
 112. Id. at 118. 
 113. Id. 
 114. Id. at 121–22. 





















Barclays      = $  7.70 return
U.S. company = $11 loss
+ $22 foreign tax credit
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= $15.40 + $3.30 U.K. tax credit = $18.70
$(30) corporate tax
+ $22 credit
+ $23.40 “trading loss”
U.S. company
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economic effect of foreign taxes from the pre-tax analysis would 
fundamentally undermine the point of the economic substance in-
quiry,” namely “to remove the challenged tax benefit and evaluate 
whether the relevant transaction makes economic sense.”116 
The Federal Circuit also heavily criticized the holding of the 
Fifth Circuit in Compaq, claiming the ADR “transactions [at issue in 
that case] produced no real economic profit.”117 
[T]he fact that the transactions produced a net gain to the taxpayer 
after taking both the foreign taxes and the foreign tax credit into 
account says nothing about the economic reality of the 
transactions, because all tax shelter transactions produce a gain 
for the taxpayer after the tax effects are taken into account—that 
is why taxpayers are willing to enter into them and to pay 
substantial fees to the promoters. The critical question is not 
whether the transaction would produce a net gain after all tax 
effects are taken into consideration; instead, the pertinent 
question[] [is] whether the transaction has real economic effects 
apart from its tax effects . . . .118 
Thus, this circuit split regarding the inclusion of foreign tax 
expenses within the pre-tax profit calculation turns on one’s view 
of the purpose of the pre-tax profit test. Inclusion is disfavored 
because the test would no longer be “pre-tax.” Yet exclusion is 
disfavored because the test examines the profit after the foreign tax 
credit, the tax benefit in question, has been applied. 
In Part IV, I explain how my proposed framework for analyzing 
objective economic substance readily accounts for both views by 
handling the inclusion of foreign taxes differently at different 
stages of the analysis. For now, I discuss this circuit split simply as 
an example of a significant difference in the measurement of pre-
tax profit by different courts. This difference has led to taxpayer 
uncertainty and accusations of reverse-engineered opinions.119 
 
 116. Id. (citation omitted). 
 117. Salem Fin., Inc. v. United States, 786 F.3d 932, 948 (Fed. Cir. 2015). Note that the 
First Circuit did not dwell on the arguments relating to the inclusion of foreign tax expenses, 
except in the sense they clarified that Old Colony did not involve foreign taxes. See Santander 
Holdings USA, Inc. v. United States, 844 F.3d 15, 24 n.11 (1st Cir. 2016). 
 118. Salem Fin., 786 F.3d at 948 (footnote omitted). 
 119. See, e.g., Cummings, supra note 13, at 1295; Lipton, supra note 18, at 32. 
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2. How much pre-tax profit? 
A second area of dispute regards how much pre-tax profit is 
necessary to satisfy the pre-tax profit test.120 Luke presents, and 
criticizes, the two major approaches courts take to answering this 
question.121 I briefly respond to each of her criticisms below, 
arguing that they should not dissuade the use of at least a 
preliminary pre-tax profit test. 
The first approach taken by courts does not stipulate a 
particular level of pre-tax profit but simply requires “that the 
expected pre-tax profit bear a reasonable relationship to the expect-
ed tax benefits.”122 In other words, the pre-tax profit cannot be 
“infinitesimally nominal and vastly insignificant when considered 
in comparison with the claimed deductions.”123 Luke criticizes this 
standard for two reasons.124 
First, Luke claims this standard invites the court to examine 
“the taxpayer’s subjective motive” and “speculat[e] about 
contingencies.”125 Specifically, Luke argues that comparing pre-tax 
profit with tax benefits will provide courts more leeway “to ensure 
a fair result given the implication of . . . moral turpitude attach[ed] 
to the taxpayer’s conduct when the tax shelter label is applied.”126 
Yet Luke’s criticism applies to any generally non-precise rule; 
moreover, her proposed comparables test is likely subject to the 
same critique.127 That is, while it is certainly true that consideration 
of the “moral turpitude” of the “tax shelter label” may color a 
court’s analysis of whether a sufficiently reasonable relationship 
exists between the amount of pre-tax profit and the amount of tax 
benefits, it is unclear whether this danger of subjectivity outweighs 
the desirable leeway given to courts to efficiently engage in the pre-
tax profit analysis. 
 
 120. See Luke, supra note 22, at 795–97; see also Bankman, supra note 12, at 23–26. 
 121. See Luke, supra note 22, at 795–97. 
 122. Id. at 795 (citing Rice’s Toyota World, Inc. v. Comm’r, 752 F.2d 89, 94 (4th Cir. 1985)). 
 123. Sheldon v. Comm’r, 94 T.C. 738, 768 (1990). 
 124. Luke, supra note 22, at 795–96. 
 125. Id. at 796. 
 126. Id. (footnote omitted). 
 127. See infra Section III.C. 
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Second, Luke argues that this proposal’s “comparison of pre-
tax profit to tax benefits introduces a new avenue for speculation—
expected net tax benefits.”128 Without guidance on making this 
comparison, Luke argues it is unclear how a court should respond 
to taxpayers’ claims “that they reasonably anticipated much lower 
tax benefits.”129 
Yet the fact that courts have historically not examined expected 
net tax benefits does not necessarily imply that courts cannot 
handle such arguments. Further, given that courts already sepa-
rately calculate expected pre-tax profit from expected after-tax 
profit, it is likely that a calculation of expected net tax benefits 
would be nothing more than the difference between the expected 
after-tax profit and the expected pre-tax profit. 
The second approach Luke criticizes suggests “that the 
reasonably anticipated pre-tax profit exceed some minimum 
amount—generally, the rate on no- or low- risk investments.”130 For 
example, courts could use “Treasury bills and notes” to “establish[] 
the required pretax rate of return.”131 Luke criticizes this proposal 
for two reasons.132 
First, Luke claims that such a standard “could cause taxpayers 
inefficiently to take on extra risk in order to ensure that the return 
on a transaction clears the minimum profit potential hurdle.”133 Yet 
any profit-related transaction involves risk, especially if it involves 
questionable tax planning. Thus, Luke is essentially arguing that 
the possibility of increased risk should deter us from adopting a 
clear rule, without explaining the likelihood of such increased risk 
or how much of an increase would actually take place. Without 
such a demonstration, her criticism loses its teeth. 
Second, Luke claims that “sophisticated taxpayers would still 
find it easy to add pre-tax profit to a particular transaction and ‘then 
hedge out of the associated risks in ways that could not readily 
be identified,’” causing the requirement to become essentially 
 
 128. Luke, supra note 22, at 796. 
 129. Id. 
 130. Id. at 795 (citing Bankman, supra note 12, at 24–25). 
 131. Bankman, supra note 12, at 25. 
 132. Luke, supra note 22, at 796–97. 
 133. Id. 
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trivial.134 Yet it is likely such hedging would be traceable, as it 
would require the taxpayer to “contribute enough net equity to 
assure [sic] that there will be significant net profit.”135 If a court 
observed such a large contribution within the transaction, they 
would likely be able to exclude it from the boundaries of the 
transaction subject to the pre-tax profit calculation. 
In total, Luke’s criticisms of methods for determining the level 
of pre-tax profit should not entirely dissuade courts from using this 
test. In their analysis, rather, courts could simply use “Treasury 
bills and notes” to “establish[] the required pretax rate of return.”136 
With significantly little risk and highly public rates of return, such 
investments provide a clear standard for tax planners.137 
3. Readily separable economics assumption 
The main criticism of the pre-tax profit test is aimed at the test’s 
“assumption that the economics of a transaction are readily 
separable from its tax components.”138 According to Luke, this 
assumption relies on “the intuition that financial assets and 
transactions are priced without regard to individual tax 
consequences” and “runs counter to principles of tax capitalization 
and efficient markets.”139 Essentially, examining pre-tax profit 
without accounting for implicit taxation will likely lead to 
inaccurate results because an implicit tax or subsidy may be 
embedded within the costs of a transaction.140 
To fully understand this criticism, consider the following hypo-
thetical Knoll presents to introduce the concept of implicit taxation: 
Consider a taxpayer who holds a (riskless) zero-coupon corporate 
bond that she purchases for $1000 and that pays $1100 at maturity 
in exactly one year. The interest on such a bond is included by the 
taxpayer in her income. Thus, if a taxpayer purchases for $1000 a 
corporate bond that pays $1100 at maturity, the taxpayer includes 
 
 134. Id. at 797 (footnote omitted) (quoting David P. Hariton, When and How Should the 
Economic Substance Doctrine Be Applied?, 60 TAX LAW REV. 29, 49 (2006)). 
 135. David P. Hariton, Sorting Out the Tangle of Economic Substance, 52 TAX LAW. 235, 
241–53 (1999). 
 136. Bankman, supra note 12, at 25. 
 137. See id. 
 138. Luke, supra note 22, at 798. 
 139. Id. at 799. 
 140. See Knoll, supra note 22, at 838. 
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$100 interest in her income. If she is taxed at 40 percent, she pays 
$40 in tax and is left with $1060 after tax. Such a taxpayer earns 10 
percent interest before tax and 6 percent interest after tax on her 
investment. Alternatively, if the taxpayer purchases a municipal 
bond, [the tax code provides that] she does not have to include the 
interest she receives in income. If such a bond has the same terms 
(and is also risk free), the taxpayer receives $1100, pays no tax and 
so ends up with $1100, which is $40 more than she has with the 
corporate bond. Expressed differently, she receives 10 percent 
both before tax and after tax with the municipal bond compared 
to 10 percent before tax and 6 percent after tax with the corporate 
bond. Thus, if both investments are available to the taxpayer, the 
taxpayer will prefer the municipal bond . . . .  
 Of course, other taxpayers . . . will also prefer the municipal 
bond to the corporate bond. As long as the terms were the same, 
no taxpayers (with positive tax rates) will want to hold corporate 
bonds. All will prefer to hold municipal bonds. Thus, we can 
expect competition among investors and issuers to drive down 
the interest rate on municipal bonds and drive up the interest rate 
on corporate bonds. To keep things simple, assume that there is 
an elastic supply of corporate bonds that pay 10 percent interest 
(so a decline in demand will not increase their interest rate) and a 
small and not as elastic supply of municipal bonds. Taxpayers will 
therefore bid down the interest rate on municipal bonds to 6 
percent. At this point, taxpayers in the 40 percent bracket will be 
indifferent between the two bonds. 
 Economists use the phrase “implicit tax” to refer to the reduc-
tion in the return from holding a tax favored investment. 141 
Knoll describes three equivalent methods “to quantify the 
implicit tax on the municipal bond” in the example above.142 For 
simplicity, I provide only the second and third methods: 
[T]he implicit tax can be described as the decrease in the payment 
on the municipal bond at maturity assuming that the municipal 
bond and the otherwise identical corporate bond cost the same 
$1000 at issuance. Such a municipal bond will pay $1060 at 
maturity. Viewed in this manner, the implicit tax is $40. . . . [T]he 
implicit tax can [also] be described as a reduction in the interest 
 
 141. Id. at 833 (footnotes omitted). 
 142. Id. 
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rate paid by the municipal bond. Viewed in this way, the implicit 
tax is a 4 percent reduction in the interest rate, from 10 percent 
down to 6 percent.143 
Thus, without accounting for the implicit taxes or subsidies in 
a transaction, a calculation of pre-tax profit is likely inaccurate.144 
That is, without taking into account implicit taxation, the pre-tax 
profit on the municipal bond in the example above appears equal 
to that of the corporate bond; yet, after implicit taxes are 
considered, the municipal bond has a significantly higher return.145 
Unlike the criticisms presented by Luke, Knoll’s criticism 
regarding the measurement of pre-tax profit causes serious 
reflection. If the straightforward pre-tax profit test inaccurately 
 
 143. Id. at 834 (footnotes omitted). The first method describes the implicit tax “as the 
increase in the issue price of the municipal bond, assuming that the municipal bond and the 
otherwise identical corporate bond pay the same $1100 at maturity.” Id. Knoll explains that 
“[s]uch a municipal bond will cost $1037.74” and that “[v]iewed in this manner, the implicit 
tax is $37.74.” Id. Knoll arrives at these results through the following calculation: 
The issue price of a one-year differentially taxed bond, P, is given by the equation: 
P = M (1 – t) / (1 + r – t), where M is the payment at maturity, r is the after-tax 
interest rate of the marginal taxpayer (that is to say, the taxpayer who sets the 
market price of the differentially taxed bond), and t is the effective tax rate paid by 
the marginal taxpayer on such a bond. In this example, M is set at $1100 and r is 6 
percent. For the municipal bond, t is 0. Accordingly, the issue price of the 
municipal bond, P, is given by the equation, P = $1100/1.06. Thus, $1037.74 [P] = 
$1100/1.06. At an issue price of $1037.74, a holder of a municipal bond earns 6 
percent interest after tax. That is to say, $1037.74 x 1.06 = $1100. 
Id. at 834 n.53. 
 144. See id. at 838. 
 145. See id. at 833. Knoll provides another example of this miscalculation of pre-tax 
profit in his discussion of Compaq. See infra Section III.B. In addition, Luke provides an 
example of the non-equivalence of pre-tax profit calculations that include and exclude 
implicit taxation: 
[C]onsider a hypothetical bond that is more highly taxed relative to the 10% yield, 
risk-adjusted benchmark. Assume that the marginal investor is a 30% bracket 
taxpayer and that a 10% tax surcharge is imposed on the highly taxed bond. For 
this investor, the after-tax return on the benchmark asset is 7%. In order to obtain 
the same after-tax yield on the highly taxed bond, the bond would need to yield 
11 2/3%—an implicit tax subsidy of 1 2/3%. If both implicit and explicit taxes are 
taken into account, the pre-tax yield on the highly taxed bond is 10%. The clientele 
for transactions or assets carrying implicit tax subsidies will be taxpayers with 
lower tax brackets than the marginal investors. For example, a 25% bracket 
taxpayer would earn slightly more on the highly taxed bond than she would on 
the benchmark. If investing $100, a 25% bracket taxpayer would earn $7.50 after-
tax on the benchmark asset and $7.58 (rounded) on the bond carrying the 10% 
tax surcharge. 
Luke, supra note 22, at 802 (footnotes omitted). 
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accounts for the profitability of transactions, it loses considerable 
justification for its application. That said, as proposed in Part IV, I 
believe this situational inaccuracy fails to warrant discarding the 
pre-tax profit test. Rather, the pre-tax profit test may be used as a 
constrained screening mechanism for determining whether further 
examination of the implicit taxation of the transaction is necessary. 
Before suggesting my framework, I discuss Knoll’s proposed 
implicit taxation regime and Luke’s proposed comparables test as 
well as the application of each proposal to Compaq. As argued 
below, because these tests require increased litigation costs, but fail 
to resolve the problem of taxpayer certainty, I do not believe they 
should be adopted on their own. 
B. Knoll’s Implicit Taxation Regime 
Knoll’s proposal is relatively simple: “assess[] pre-tax profit 
before implicit taxes” to increase the accuracy of the pre-tax profit 
test.146 Yet, as explained below, because implicit taxes remain 
difficult to determine and require a significant market analysis, 
Knoll’s proposal will likely increase litigation costs without a 
guaranteed increase in taxpayer certainty. Before demonstrating 
this result, I summarize Knoll’s application of his implicit taxation 
regime to Compaq.147 
Knoll would have affirmed the Tax Court’s finding that 
Compaq did not have a pre-tax profit, basing his result on an 
implicit tax analysis rather than a rule that simply included foreign 
tax expenses.148 That is, Knoll contends that “Compaq did not pay 
$887.5 million before tax.”149 Rather, this price takes into account a 
“negative implicit tax (implicit subsidy) paid by Compaq that is a 
direct result of the [Dutch] withholding tax.”150 
The withholding tax suppressed the cum dividend price of 
Compaq’s [Royal Dutch] stock by $3.4 million—the amount that 
Shell subsequently withheld and paid over to the Dutch taxing 
authorities on Compaq’s behalf. Thus, the amount paid by 
 
 146. Knoll, supra note 22, at 843–45. 
 147. See id. at 839–42. 
 148. See id. 
 149. Id. at 839. 
 150. Id. 
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Compaq before all taxes (including implicit and explicit taxes, 
whether positive or negative) for its [Royal Dutch] stock was 
$890.9 million. Thus, Compaq’s before-tax cost, including 
expenses ($1.4 million), was $892.3 million. That exceeded its 
before-tax proceeds of $890.9 million by $1.5 million. Thus, when 
proper account is taken of implicit taxes, the transactions pro-
duced a pre-tax loss, not a pre-tax gain.151 
In total, when the Royal Dutch ADRs “went from trading cum 
dividend to ex dividend, it also went from trading cum withholding 
tax liability to trading ex withholding tax liability.”152 To demon-
strate this difference was actually included in the price of the ADRs, 
Knoll analyzes the composition of the market.153 
 If the market for the [Royal Dutch] ADRs contained many 
investors who could use the full foreign tax credit, then the market 
would value the dividend at its gross amount and the price of the 
stock would have dropped when the stock went ex dividend by 
the gross dividend. Alternatively, if the market contained few in-
vestors who could use the foreign tax credit in whole or part, then 
the market would have valued the dividend at its net amount and 
the price of the stock would have dropped when it went ex 
dividend by the amount of the net dividend. Moreover, such a tax 
would have reduced the sale price of the stock before the stock 
went ex dividend by the present value of withholding tax.154 
Because “the actual market for [Royal Dutch] ADRs in 1992 was 
composed of both types of investors,” and “evidence from the 
market suggests that the investors who paid the Dutch withholding 
tax, but did not receive any benefit from the tax[,] set the price of 
[Royal Dutch] ADRs,” Knoll concludes that the price of the ADRs 
 
 151. Id. (footnote omitted). See Appendix (Diagram B) for a table provided by Knoll, 
summarizing his result. 
 152. Id. at 841. 
 153. Id. (“For holders of [Royal Dutch] stock who could use the full foreign tax credit 
and had no problem with the embedded capital loss (because they had capital gains that the 
losses could offset), the Dutch withholding tax was not detrimental. For such taxpayers, the 
Dutch withholding tax was offset by a dollar-for-dollar reduction in the tax paid to the U.S. 
government. Accordingly, such taxpayers valued the dividend at its gross amount. 
Conversely, for taxpayers who could not make any use of the foreign tax credit, the Dutch 
withholding tax was a detriment to the full extent of the tax. Accordingly, such taxpayers 
valued the dividend at its net amount.”). 
 154. Id. 
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should have only dropped by the net dividend, not the whole 
dividend.155 In other words, because the Netherlands tax rate was 
15%, the purchase price of the ADRs would have been “equal to 
market price plus 85% of the gross dividend,” because “the seller 
was unable to use the U.S. foreign tax credit to offset the 
Netherlands withholding tax.”156 Thus, engaging in a sophisticated 
market analysis, Knoll concludes that because the transaction at 
issue in Compaq was subject to an implicit subsidy—and therefore, 
the sale price of the ADRs should have been the net dividend, not 
the gross dividend—the transaction should have failed the pre-tax 
profit test.157 
While Knoll’s implicit taxation regime would theoretically 
increase the accuracy of the pre-tax profit test, it sacrifices precision 
and increases litigation costs. That is, the pre-tax profit test utilizes 
clear boundaries between tax expenses and benefits and the 
ordinary costs of a transaction.158 In contrast, Knoll’s implicit 
taxation regime requires a sophisticated market analysis that 
requires aggregating behavior among similarly situated taxpayers 
engaging in similar transactions.159 This increases the variables 
within a court’s ESD analysis and, given the probable lack of 
institutional competence regarding implicit taxation,160 would lead 
to greater taxpayer uncertainty and accusations of reverse-
engineered opinions. 
 
 155. Id. at 842 (“It might . . . be thought that the market represented an average or 
midpoint of those investors. Equilibrium, however, in financial markets is determined not 
by the average, but by the marginal, investor. Because most investors likely would have 
received either no value or full value on the foreign tax credit, one or the other group of 
investors likely determined the market price for Shell ADRs when Compaq entered the 
market in 1992. Moreover, evidence from the market suggests that the investors who paid 
the Dutch withholding tax, but did not receive any benefit from that tax set the price of Shell 
ADRs. That is to say, at the margin, prices were set by investors who could not use the 
withholding tax to offset other taxes. When the Shell ADRs went from trading cum dividend 
to ex dividend, their price dropped not by the gross dividend, but by the net dividend. The 
price dropped by only the net dividend because the withholding tax had already depressed 
the cum dividend price of the ADRs by the (expected present value) of the withholding tax.”  
(footnote omitted)). Note that Knoll does not provide any citation for his evidence regarding 
the market for Royal Dutch ADRs. See id. 
 156. Luke, supra note 22, at 818. 
 157. Knoll, supra note 22, at 842. 
 158. See Bankman, supra note 12, at 15. 
 159. See Knoll, supra note 22, at 841–42. 
 160. See id. at 846–47. 
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C. Luke’s Comparables Test 
Generally, Luke’s comparables test asks whether a “suspect 
transaction yields a return that is substantially similar to [that of a] 
comparable [legitimate] transaction”; if so, the taxpayer satisfies the 
objective ESD inquiry.161 As will be argued below, while this 
analysis avoids the problematic “assumption that the economics of 
a transaction are readily separable from its tax components,”162 it 
significantly increases the variables involved in the ESD analysis, 
increasing litigation costs and taxpayer uncertainty. In the end, 
courts will be forced to choose between the competing parties’ 
proposed comparables—causing the inquiry to follow a path 
similar to Seventh Amendment jury or judge cases.163 
Luke’s comparables analysis approaches any suspect trans-
action by first applying the four-step comparables test: (1) define 
the boundaries of the transaction at issue; (2) identify a set of 
“market comparables” and an “economically equivalent” trans-
action; (3) calculate the after-tax return on both the transaction at 
issue and its comparable;164 and (4) determine whether the after-tax 
returns are “substantially similar.”165 If the after-tax returns are 
similar, then the transaction presumably satisfies the ESD.166 Yet, 
should the after-tax returns be sufficiently dissimilar, the presump-
tion that the transaction at issue violates the ESD may be rebutted 
 
 161. Luke, supra note 22, at 805. The test relies on the “‘law of one price’—the idea ‘that 
if two assets are equivalent in all economically relevant respects, then they should have the 
same market price.’” Id. at 804 (quoting ZVI BODIE ET AL., INVESTMENTS 349 (6th ed. 2005)). 
This law applies “only if the two assets are compared (1) before all taxes, including implicit 
taxes and implicit tax subsidies, or (2) after all taxes as measured from the viewpoint of the 
price-setting investors—that is, the marginal investors.” Id. Luke opts for the “after all taxes” 
option as it already “takes into account implicit taxes and subsidies.” Id. 
 162. Id. at 798. 
 163. That is, judges would be presented with a number of proposed comparable 
transactions and, in attempting to make sense of them, would likely choose the one that was 
argued best by the parties. See generally STEPHEN C. YEAZELL, CIVIL PROCEDURE 608–13 (8th 
ed. 2012) (discussing the “historical test” applied to new claims and new procedures, which 
requires locating a historically analogous claim and asking whether it is the kind of claim 
that would have had a judge or jury decide the case). 
 164. Note that, in actuality, steps (1), (2), and (3) would not be separated by a court 
when engaging in their inquiry. Thus, a court could potentially reverse-engineer their choice 
between “market comparables” if they knew that one set had a typically lower rate of return 
than the other. 
 165. See Luke, supra note 22, at 785. 
 166. Id. at 802. 
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by demonstrating the taxpayer belongs to a “naturally occurring 
tax clientele.”167 As a catch-all, if no “market comparables” are 
available to adequately assess the similarity between the after-tax 
returns, then the court should engage in a pseudo-comparables test 
and a multi-factor, open-ended analysis of the transaction.168 
In defining the boundaries of a transaction, Luke would 
consider the same factors utilized by the pre-tax profit test.169 To 
identify “market comparables,” however, the transaction at issue 
and its comparable must (1) belong to a “reasonably efficient” 
market which (2) has “reasonably accessible” information available 
about it.170 These conditions are required because (1) “in order to 
exploit the identity of returns on economically equivalent trans-
actions or assets, the market must be relatively well functioning”; 
and (2) “in order to make the comparison, sufficient access to 
information about the market must be available.”171 
After defining the boundaries of the transaction at issue and 
identifying a set of “market comparables,” Luke’s analysis then 
requires identifying “economically equivalent” transactions. As 
Luke explains: 
 Economic equivalence would be determined by matching up 
factors that contribute to expected and actual rates of return. The 
precise identity and weight of the factors that contribute to return 
variance is the subject of much ongoing scholarship, potentially 
making economic equivalence seem a problematic method to 
deny tax benefits. In spite of similar concerns, however, contro-
versial economic models are routinely used in the financial world, 
for example, in rating portfolio manager performance. In addi-
tion, the universe of comparables for a transaction suspected of 
being a tax shelter may frequently look most similar to the low-
risk world of simple debt transactions (with perhaps some remote 
opportunity of an equity-type gain at the end, included in order 
to confuse courts). The factors that determine interest rates on 
simple debt are not especially complicated or controversial (e.g., 
 
 167. Id. at 803. 
 168. Id. 
 169. Id. at 806–07; see supra Section III.A.1. 
 170. Luke, supra note 22, at 809–10. Luke does not provide detail as to the scope of such 
a category of transactions and whether it would contain significantly more than the market 
for “safe” comparables. 
 171. Id. at 809. 
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loan term, credit considerations, market interest rates, and 
inflationary expectations), and public information about interest 
rates is readily available. Even when dealing with more complex 
debt securities, the factors that contribute to variance in yield to 
maturity are fairly well settled.172 
After identifying any “economically equivalent” transactions, 
one calculates the after-tax profit of the suspect transaction and the 
“economically equivalent” transaction173 and determines whether 
they are substantially similar. If the after-tax returns are not 
“substantially similar,” then the transaction is presumed to fail 
the ESD.174 
Luke does not explain how dissimilar the returns of the com-
pared transactions must be in order for the transaction at issue to 
fail her comparables test, but she does provide an example in which 
a difference of approximately 6% is sufficiently dissimilar.175 Thus, 
Luke’s criticisms regarding the level of pre-tax profit necessary to 
satisfy the pre-tax profit test176 may be equally applied to her own 
comparables test. That is, when comparing the after-tax returns of 
transactions, it is unclear (1) how much higher an after-tax return 
must be to no longer be “substantially similar” and (2) whether a 
taxpayer, with knowledge of the sufficient difference in rates, may 
structure her transaction to achieve this rate and trivially satisfy 
the ESD.177 
The underlying rationale for Luke’s comparables test is that “a 
rational taxpayer would not bother with a tax shelter earning an after-
tax return that is no better than that available on an economically 
equivalent market transaction.”178 Yet, as Luke acknowledges, certain 
tax clienteles may obtain a “higher-than-market return” simply 
because “of the progressive rate bracket system.”179 Thus, Luke 
 
 172. Id. at 809–10 (footnotes omitted). 
 173. Luke provides an extensive discussion of how after-tax profit would be calculated. 
See id. at 807–09. Due to limitations on the scope of this Comment, this discussion is omitted. 
 174. Id. 
 175. See infra discussion of Luke’s application of her comparables test to Compaq. 
 176. See supra Section III.A.1. 
 177. For example, a taxpayer may purposely decrease her revenue in certain areas of 
the transaction so that she achieves a comparable rate of return when including the 
tax benefit. 
 178. Luke, supra note 22, at 805. 
 179. Id. at 810. 
 
4.HOUCHENS_FIN_NOHEADER.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 8/17/18  10:40 AM 
BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW 2018 
190 
permits the presumption against a transaction that fails her 
comparables test to be rebutted by demonstrating that “the high 
return arose as a result of a [’naturally occurring’] tax bracket 
differential.”180 This demonstration “would require an examination 
of the tax profiles of the counterparties in the transaction” as well as 
whether the difference in tax profiles “was pre-engineered in some 
way.”181 As will be discussed below, the determination of whether a 
taxpayer belongs to a “naturally occurring” tax bracket differential is 
subject to general fairness factors.182 
Luke also acknowledges that there will be situations in which 
“market comparables” are unavailable and a pseudo-comparables 
test becomes more appropriate; for example, her test is entirely 
inapplicable to “home-grown” tax shelters.183 In these situations, 
Luke recommends that courts engage in an “open-ended inquiry” 
that begins with an examination of the “suggested comparables” 
and a determination of whether “the claimed benefits arose in an 
economically meaningful way.”184 That is, while “the suggested 
comparables would already have been determined by the court to 
be unsuitable for the purpose of applying the presumption of the 
comparables test, they may still provide some indication of the 
likelihood that the claimed benefits arose in an economically 
meaningful way.”185 
In addition to this pseudo-comparables test, a court would also 
consider “the factors that would go into determining price as 
between parties operating at arm’s length.”186 
Other relevant evidence would include: the presence of nontax, 
market frictions or asymmetries; the ease with which other 
 
 180. Id. 
 181. Id. at 810–11. 
 182. See infra discussion of Luke’s application of her comparables test to Compaq. 
 183. See Luke, supra note 22, at 807, 811–12. Luke comments that “home-grown” tax 
shelters evade the grasp of the pre-tax profit test. Id. at 807. We assume Luke’s argument is 
that, because it is difficult to define transaction boundaries of “home-grown” tax shelters, 
the pre-tax profit test won’t be able to find its start. Yet, assuming some boundaries of the 
transaction could be defined, it is likely that the pre-tax profit test would have a better chance 
of addressing “home-grown” tax shelters than her comparables test because one wouldn’t 
also be required to find a market comparable to assess the transaction. 
 184. Id. at 811. 
 185. Id. 
 186. Id. 
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taxpayers could have entered into the transaction; the presence or 
absence of a known tax-shelter promoter; the degree of depen-
dence of the after-tax return on particular tax attributes of the tax-
payer or counterparty; the timing and circumstances surrounding 
the creation of those tax attributes; the degree of leverage and the 
taxpayer’s out-of-pocket investment; the level of transaction risk; 
and the pre-tax profit potential.187 
Luke applies her comparables analysis to Compaq and, like 
Knoll, would affirm the Tax Court, holding that the transaction 
at issue violated the ESD.188 Making no alteration to the defined 
transaction, Luke calculates Compaq’s after-tax rate of return at 
9%.189 Next, Luke suggests that the “economically equivalent 
market comparable” of the transaction at issue in Compaq is “a 
collateralized, short-term loan to [the seller]—or, in more techni-
cal terms, . . . a reverse repurchase agreement (reverse repo).”190 
In determining this “market comparable,” Luke notes because 
the only risks of the transaction “were the extraordinarily remote 
possibility that an unrelated third party would break up the 
cross-sales [or] that [the seller] would default on its obligation to 
repurchase,” they could be “safely ignored when approaching 
 
 187. Id. at 812. 
 188. Id. at 821–22 (citing Knoll, supra note 22, at 839). 
 189. Id. at 822 (“Compaq reported a $20.7 million capital loss, which at a uniform 34% 
rate would yield $7 million of tax savings. Although Compaq would have to pay tax of $7.7 
million to the U.S. government and $3.4 million to the Netherlands on the gross dividend of 
$22.5 million, it would receive a $3.4 million foreign tax credit for the taxes paid to the 
Netherlands. Thus, the total post-tax return amount was $1.1 million. Compaq only invested 
$20.7 million (at most) of its own money. While it may seem appropriate to compute the rate 
of post-tax return on this amount, in order to make a rate comparison between Compaq’s 
suspect transaction and economically equivalent transactions, the investment base should be 
the $887.6 million ADR purchase price (even though most of this was borrowed). With the 
larger base, the total after-tax return is approximately 0.124%, but this is the return over a 
five-day period. If Compaq continued to earn the same rate over a year-long period, the 
annual return would have been approximately 9%.” (footnotes omitted)). 
 190. Id. at 823 (“In a reverse repo, a buyer/lender purchases securities for cash from 
a seller/borrower. The parties agree that at the end of some stated time period—frequently 
a matter of days or weeks—the seller/borrower will buy the securities back from the 
original buyer/lender at a set price reflecting an interest component (the repo rate). 
Reverse repos carry some risk of default, which increases with the length of time the 
transaction is held open. The value of collateral mitigates this risk and affects the overall 
return.” (footnotes omitted)). 
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the problem of locating an economically equivalent mar- 
ket comparable.”191 
With a “market comparable” in hand, Luke then determines 
that the typical rate of return of a “reverse repo” is somewhere 
between approximately 2.02% and 2.16%.192 Because, in Luke’s 
view, this rate is not substantially similar to a return of 9%, the 
transaction presumptively fails the ESD.193 
With a presumption of no economic substance established, the 
burden shifts onto Compaq to demonstrate that their high rate of 
return “was the result of Compaq being a member of a naturally 
occurring tax clientele for these ADRs.”194 Relying on a discussion 
by Professors Klein and Stark, Luke believes that Compaq would 
be unable to make such a demonstration.195 That is, “the rule at 
issue in Compaq was one tied to the arbitrary decision to tax 
dividends to the owner on the record date.”196 Thus,  
[t]he Compaq arbitrage opportunity seems to have arisen because 
the two parties valued the dividend differently. . . . Indeed, any 
investor subject to any tax rate should find the Compaq transaction 
attractive, as long as it is allowed to deduct the capital loss that 
arises from the sale of the stock ex-dividend.197 
Luke further points to the following “factors weighing against 
the possibility” that Compaq belonged to a “naturally occurring” 
tax clientele: “the prearranged nature of the Compaq transaction[;] 
the ‘purchase’ of the transaction through a tax shelter promoter”; 
“the use of one of the promoter’s clients as the counterparty”; and 
 
 191. Id. 
 192. Id. at 823–24 (“Treasury securities are commonly used as collateral, and data on 
repo rates for nontreasury securities is difficult to obtain. One substitute is the ‘general 
collateral rate,’ which is the term used for the highest repo rate available at a particular time 
on treasuries. ‘The overnight general collateral rate is commonly near the federal funds rate.’ 
For the time period at issue in Compaq, the overnight federal funds rate was an annualized 
return of between 3.07% and 3.28%. Applying a 34% tax rate would give a range of 2.02% to 
2.16%. The five-day term would increase the return, but it is doubtful that any increase 
would bring it into substantial proximity to Compaq’s annualized 9% after-tax return.” 
(footnotes omitted)). 
 193. Id. at 824. 
 194. Id. 
 195. Id. 
 196. Id. 
 197. Id. (citation omitted). 
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“[t]he preciseness of the match” between Compaq’s payment price 
and the ADR market price plus net dividend.198 
Luke notes that, “[o]f course, Compaq did not know that the 
counterparty would be the same on both the purchase and the re-
sale of the ADRs, and it may not have viewed the transaction as in 
substance a ‘reverse repurchase agreement.’”199 Yet she claims that 
Compaq’s ignorance of the substance of the transaction “points 
more toward failure of objective economic substance than other-
wise.”200 That is, “[a]t a minimum, Compaq certainly knew it had 
left the details of the transaction in the hands of a promoter of tax 
avoidance shelters.”201 Thus, the transaction at issue in Compaq fails 
Luke’s comparables test, and thereby violates the ESD, because it 
has a rate of return that is not substantially similar to that of a 
“reverse repo,” and Compaq did not belong to a “naturally occur-
ring” tax clientele. 
While Luke’s comparables analysis avoids the problematic 
“assumption [of the pre-tax profit test] that the economics of a 
transaction are readily separable from its tax components,”202 it 
significantly increases tax-planning and litigation costs and 
taxpayer uncertainty. First, tax-planning costs would increase 
because not only would parties be required to investigate the 
market of their own transaction, as in Knoll’s implicit taxation 
regime, but they would also be required to scour the sea of potential 
“comparable” transactions as well as determine whether the 
market of their own transaction was “reasonably efficient” with 
“reasonably accessible” information available about it. Likewise, 
litigation costs would increase substantially, as parties would need 
to spend significant amounts of ink distinguishing and comparing 
various transactions. 
This increase in litigation would likely lead to taxpayer 
uncertainty and accusations of reverse-engineered decisions. 
Taxpayers would find themselves in a situation similar to litigants 
in Seventh Amendment judge or jury cases, proposing flower 
 
 198. Id. at 824–25. 
 199. Id. at 825. 
 200. Id. 
 201. Id. 
 202. Id. at 798. 
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transactions that match their own in a garden of weeds.203 Further, 
given the likelihood that suspect transactions examined by the ESD 
are arranged by a third-party “tax shelter promoter”204 and are thus 
likely “home-grown,” it is difficult to predict the likelihood that 
Luke’s comparables test will even be applicable to those trans-
actions that raise questions of economic substance. 
Where no “market comparable” exists, Luke provides no 
reason to believe her pseudo-comparables test will be reliable.205 
Likewise, leaving the inquiry open to a multi-factored, “open-
ended” analysis provides no constraints on courts from engaging 
in reverse-engineered decision-making. 
In the end, Luke’s attempt to avoid the problematic “assump-
tion that the economics of a transaction are readily separable from 
its tax components”206 leads to significantly increased tax planning 
costs, litigation costs, and taxpayer uncertainty. Likewise, while not 
to the same extent, Knoll’s implicit taxation regime would likely 
increase litigation costs without increasing taxpayer certainty. To 
resolve these concerns, I propose an alternative three-stage analy-
sis, borrowing from antitrust law. It reduces litigation costs by 
preserving the level of taxpayer certainty that comes with a 
straightforward pre-tax profit test while accounting for the test’s 
accuracy problems for special cases. 
IV. PRE-TAX PROFIT AS A PER SE RULE: AN ANTITRUST ANALOGY 
My proposal begins by attempting to resolve the circuit split 
regarding the inclusion of foreign tax expenses.207 Borrowing from 
antitrust law, I suggest a three-stage analysis that distinguishes the 
analysis required for per se valid, and per se invalid, transactions 
from those that require an increased level of scrutiny. This 
 
 203. The Seventh Amendment cases apply a historical analysis of whether a jury would 
have been used for the type of issue before the court when the Constitution was drafted. See 
generally YEAZELL, supra note 163, at 608–13. 
 204. See supra note 12 (listing tax cases where a third-party promoter is involved). 
 205. That is, the pseudo-comparables test rests on the assumptions of a “reasonably 
efficient” market with “reasonably accessible” information about it, which increase the relia-
bility of the comparables test. See supra text accompanying note 170. 
 206. Luke, supra note 22, at 798. 
 207. See supra Section III.A.1. 
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proposed test may be generalized to address all transactions subject 
to the ESD. 
The dispute in the circuit split cases described above is whether 
foreign tax expenses should be included in the pre-tax profit 
calculation.208 As mentioned above, the resolution of this dispute 
rests on one’s view of the pre-tax profit test; namely, whether it is 
simply intended to measure the profit of a transaction before taking 
into account any tax benefits, or whether it is intended to determine 
the profitability of a transaction before a tax benefit is granted.209 It 
is clear both sides agree that if a transaction is profitable, even when 
foreign taxes are included, then it satisfies the objective ESD.210 
Likewise, if a transaction is unprofitable, even when foreign taxes 
are excluded, it fails the objective ESD.211 Under my proposal, the 
former is a per se valid transaction under the objective ESD and the 
latter is a per se invalid transaction under the objective ESD. That 
is, this is the first-stage of the objective ESD analysis. Before 
describing the next two stages, I briefly summarize the antitrust 
framework to which my proposal analogizes. 
Within antitrust law, to determine whether a violation of 
section 1 of the Sherman Act has occurred—i.e., a “contract, 
combination . . . , or conspiracy, in restraint of trade”212—courts 
have developed a per se/rule of reason framework.213 An example 
of a per se violation is price-fixing among competitors, which has 
almost always been condemned in its various forms.214 Courts 
deem price-fixing to be a per se violation because the various ver-
sions of price-fixing are typically significant restraints on trade and 
because a per se rule is able to heavily deter behavior like the 
restraint in question.215 That is, recognizing price-fixing as a per 
se violation of the Sherman Act is unlikely to produce Type I 
errors and efficiently makes use of a court’s resources. Judge 
 
 208. See supra Section III.A.1. 
 209. See supra Section III.A.1. 
 210. See generally Bank of N.Y. Mellon Corp. v. Comm’r, 801 F.3d 104 (2d Cir. 2015). 
 211. See id. 
 212. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2012). 
 213. See ANDREW I. GAVIL ET AL., ANTITRUST LAW IN PERSPECTIVE: CASES, CONCEPTS 
AND PROBLEMS IN COMPETITION POLICY 93–128, 175–211 (2d ed. 2002). 
 214. See Arizona v. Maricopa Cty. Med. Soc’y, 457 U.S. 332 (1982); GAVIL ET AL., supra 
note 213, at 93–128. 
 215. See Maricopa, 457 U.S. at 332; GAVIL ET AL., supra note 213, at 93–128. 
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Posner has also suggested that there should be instances of per 
se legal restrictions on trade, such as “purely vertical restrictions 
on distribution.”216 
In contrast, when it is alleged that multiple firms have engaged 
in exclusionary conduct such as predatory pricing or a refusal to 
deal, the court engages in a much more extensive analysis that takes 
into account multiple factors indicating the anticompetitive and 
procompetitive effects of the firm’s behavior.217 This analysis, 
referred to as the “rule of reason,” is utilized to avoid Type I errors 
for conduct that may simply be vigorously competitive. Yet, 
because of the high costs associated with engaging in the extensive 
market and contract analyses within the rule of reason framework, 
courts have sometimes applied a “quick look” framework.218 This 
framework may label conduct as presumptively restraining trade 
by resting on a relatively simple market analysis or the “expe-
rience” of the court.219 The framework’s purpose is to avoid Type I 
errors but also avoid the extensive litigation costs associated with a 
rule of reason analysis. 
Generally, this per se/rule of reason framework increases firm 
certainty by providing a spectrum of legality over specific cate-
gories of behavior, as well as a spectrum regarding the level of 
scrutiny courts will give toward particular transactions.220 This 
allows firms to appropriately assess, first, the likelihood of the 
legality of their conduct and, second, the level of scrutiny a court 
will likely apply towards their conduct—which allows clients and 
firms to assess litigation costs.221 My proposed framework seeks 
to transfer these certainty-increasing mechanisms to the objec-
tive ESD.222 
 
 216. Richard A. Posner, The Next Step in the Antitrust Treatment of Restricted Distribution: 
Per Se Legality, 48 U. CHI. L. REV. 6, 8 (1981). 
 217. See Brooke Grp. Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S. 209, 231 
(1993); GAVIL ET AL., supra note 213, at 175–211. 
 218. See Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85 
(1984); GAVIL ET AL., supra note 213, at 185–87. 
 219. GAVIL ET AL., supra note 213, at 185–87. 
 220. See Frank H. Easterbrook, The Limits of Antitrust, 63 TEX. L. REV. 1, 14–39 (1984). 
 221. See id. 
 222. These certainty-increasing mechanisms are also found in Delaware corporate law 
through its analysis of conflicted transactions applying a tiered framework of the entire 
fairness standard, a burden shifted entire fairness standard, and the business judgment rule. 
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First, a suspect transaction that is pre-tax profitable, including 
foreign tax expenses in the calculation, is treated as per se valid. 
However, if the suspect transaction is pre-tax unprofitable, while 
excluding foreign tax expenses, then it is per se invalid.223 If the 
suspect transaction falls outside either of these categories, then a 
court will engage in a “quick-look” analysis examining whether 
there is enough market data to conclude that the transaction’s pre-
tax profit was attributable to an implicit tax or subsidy. If the 
market data is insufficient to make a showing either way, then the 
court may engage in a “rule of reason” style analysis that ap- 
plies Luke’s comparables analysis.224 Figure 3 diagrams this pro-
posed analysis. 
 
See generally CLAIRE HILL ET AL., MERGERS AND ACQUISITIONS: LAW, THEORY, AND PRACTICE 
649–88 (2016); Kahn v. M & F Worldwide Corp., 88 A.3d 635 (Del. 2014); Kahn v. Lynch 
Commc’n Sys., Inc., 638 A.2d 1110 (Del. 1994); Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701 (Del. 
1983); In re CNX Gas Corp. S’holders Litig., 4 A.3d 397 (Del. Ch. 2010); In re Cox Commc’ns, 
Inc. S’holders Litig., 879 A.2d 604 (Del. Ch. 2005). 
 223. This is subject, of course, to a subjective business purpose analysis. See supra notes 
12, 16 and accompanying text. 
 224. As I was writing this Comment, one colleague suggested a potentially simpler 
solution: If a transaction falls outside the per se categories, economic substance should be 
determined by asking whether the challenged portion of the transaction was reasonably 
necessary to accomplish the transaction as a whole.  
For example, in Compaq, the foreign tax expenses were, arguably, reasonably necessary 
to the transaction as a whole because an essential element of this transaction was the 
purchase and resale of foreign stock (ADRs). In contrast, the foreign address of the trust in 
the STARS transaction would likely be argued to not be reasonably necessary to the 
transaction as a whole. As the Second Circuit pointed out, “the transactions themselves 
‘fictionalize’ the concept of international trade” by containing a foreign address. Bank of N.Y. 
Mellon Corp. v. Comm’r, 801 F.3d 104, 118 (2d Cir. 2015). The funds never left the United 
States but were still taxed as if in the United Kingdom “because BNY installed a nominal 
U.K. trustee.” Id. at 118–19. Further, “the SPVs had no real employees or business purpose 
of their own beyond creating tax benefits for both the lender and borrower.” Id. at 119.  
As promising as this suggested solution appears, the “reasonable necessity” inquiry 
quickly subsumes the question into the second, subjective prong of the ESD-business 
purpose. That is, by questioning whether a portion of a transaction is reasonably necessary 
to the transaction as a whole, one is essentially asking whether there is a business purpose 
to the challenged portion of the transaction. Some may argue that this is an appropriate 
result—that if the transaction fails to satisfy a per se test, the objective inquiry of the ESD is 
complete and one should engage in a subjective analysis. However, as argued below, I 
believe there is still room for a cost-effective, objective analysis that preserves more 
predictable results for the parties than a subjective test. 
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Figure 3. Proposed Antitrust Analogy for the Objective Prong of 
the ESD 
 
 Applying this analysis to Compaq, because the transaction is 
neither profitable when including foreign tax expenses nor 
unprofitable when excluding foreign tax expenses, Knoll’s implicit 
taxation analysis would be applicable. Assuming there was 
evidentiary support that the market actually valued the Royal 
Dutch ADRs at the market price plus net dividend rather than the 
market price plus gross dividend,225 the analysis would be 
complete, concluding under the “quick look” test that the trans-
action was pre-tax unprofitable and therefore violates the objective 
ESD. However, if there was insufficient evidence to make this 
determination, then Luke’s comparables analysis would apply and 
would examine factors such as “market comparables,” the tax 
clientele of the taxpayer, and other factors contributing to the 
fairness of the transaction.226 
I take note that the analysis of tax law is typically contrasted 
with the analysis of antitrust law,227 and therefore, my proposed 
framework may be considered out of place. For example, Judge 
Easterbrook comments that “tax laws are read particularistically, 
as rules rather than standards, as specifying required conduct rather 
than desired end states.”228 He attributes this difference in appli-
cation to “the nature of delegation,” claiming that “zero power 
has been delegated to judges in tax cases.”229 Yet, as discussed 
 
 225. See supra note 153 and accompanying text. 
 226. See supra Section III.C. 
 227. Frank H. Easterbrook, Judicial Discretion in Statutory Interpretation, 57 OKLA. L. REV. 
1, 6–7 (2004). 
 228. Id. at 7. 
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throughout this Comment, the ESD and other related doctrines 
have developed through the common law with the approval of 
Congress.230 Thus, judges have been delegated the authority to 
apply standard-based reasoning to assess the validity of certain 
tax benefits. Given this authority, it is reasonable that courts look 
for guidance in their reasoning to the fields of antitrust and 
corporate law, areas particularly concerned with promoting client 
certainty without becoming internally self-defeating. 
My proposed framework would appropriately increase 
taxpayer certainty while limiting litigation costs. That is, similar to 
the per se/rule of reason framework of antitrust law, the proposed 
framework allows taxpayers to appropriately assess, first, the 
likelihood of the court’s finding of objective economic substance 
within a transaction and, second, the level of scrutiny a court will 
likely apply toward a transaction. It balances the clarity of the pre-
tax profit test with the accuracy of Knoll’s implicit taxation regime 
by including foreign taxes within the per se analysis and engag-
ing in an implicit taxation analysis, or comparables analysis, only 
if necessary. 
A potential problem with my proposed framework is that it 
straightforwardly includes foreign taxes within the pre-tax profit 
calculation.231 Knoll has criticized this move for two reasons.232 
First, Knoll speculates that a tax shelter that generates huge foreign 
tax savings, but was actually a tax shelter, could be classified as a 
legitimate transaction because the savings would be calculated as 
“‘before-tax’ profit.”233 Second, Knoll points out that “business 
transactions with no evident tax motivation or benefit [could turn] 
into tax shelters.”234 For example, “borrowing money at 7 percent 
that generates a U.S. tax deduction in order to invest that money 
abroad at 10 percent in a country that imposes tax at 35 percent 
would qualify as a tax shelter.”235 
 
 230. See supra Part II. 
 231. See Knoll, supra note 22, at 848. 
 232. Id. at 848–49. 
 233. Id. at 849. This criticism is similar to the Fifth and Eighth Circuits’ concern of 
treating foreign tax expenses differently than other forms of taxes and subsidies. 
 234. Id. 
 235. Id. 
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Yet, with respect to Knoll’s latter criticism, such a transaction 
would be validated under my proposed rule because it would fall 
outside the per se boundaries and, thus, be subject to a quick-look 
analysis examining the presence of any implicit taxation. Further, 
with respect to Knoll’s former criticism, Knoll acknowledges that 
foreign tax savings may not be counted as pre-tax profit; however, 
“[i]t is unclear how such a rule would operate in practice.”236 I 
envision my proposed analysis would narrowly include foreign tax 
savings, thus making the situation described by Knoll unlikely. 
Specifically, my proposed analysis would only consider foreign tax 
savings that occurred through subsidies by the foreign countries 
specifically related to the taxpayer’s foreign tax expenses in that 
country. Such a limitation would avoid the situation feared by 
Knoll; namely, because I performed the transaction in country A 
instead of country B, the amount I saved by doing so should be 
included as revenue in my calculation of pre-tax profit. 
In the end, this proposed analysis would increase taxpayer 
certainty because it provides them with “safe zones” as well as 
constrained tests. In particular, if a party can prove either of the 
outer bounds of the per se analysis, then they may reliably predict 
whether their transaction will violate the objective ESD. The party 
increases their risk when they do not fall within one of the per se 
categories; however, they may predict for such circumstances by 
collecting evidence related to the market surrounding their 
transaction to support the existence, or non-existence, of some 
implicit tax or subsidy. Finally, should there be weak or insufficient 
market evidence, a party may attempt to ensure that the transaction 
satisfies the objective ESD by finding a “market comparable” that 
has a “substantially similar” after-tax rate of return. 
This proposed analysis, designed for debates regarding the 
inclusion of foreign tax expenses, may be generalized by replacing 
foreign taxes with the expense that the taxpayer would not have to pay 
should they receive the tax benefit in question. That is, one would 
examine whether the transaction was profitable by including the 
expenses that the taxpayer would supposedly be able to avoid 
given the tax benefit they claim. If so, then the transaction would 
be considered per se valid. If not, and the transaction would not 
 
 236. Id. at 849 n.91. 
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even have been profitable with the tax benefit applied, then the 
transaction would be considered per se invalid. If neither of these 
conditions is satisfied, then it makes sense for the court to engage 
in a deeper investigation of the transaction under the implicit 
taxation and, if necessary, comparables analyses. 
Figure 4. Generalized Proposed Antitrust Analogy Analysis 
 
 In conclusion, while the pre-tax profit test rests on the 
assumption that the pre-tax profits of a transaction may easily be 
separated from the rest of the transaction, it remains a useful per se 
rule for determining whether a transaction should be further 
scrutinized for economic substance. Likewise, while Knoll’s 
examination of implicit taxation and Luke’s comparables analysis 
require extensively more litigation costs, these analyses are worth 
engaging in by courts when a transaction remains unresolved by 
the per se pre-tax profit test. 
My proposed framework of the objective economic substance 
analysis borrows from antitrust law. While antitrust analysis is 
typically considered antithetical to tax analysis, its utilization 
within the narrow realm of the ESD appropriately balances Judge 
Hand’s concerns regarding taxpayer certainty and the potentially 
self-defeating nature of the tax code. It provides a spectrum of 
defenses the taxpayer may rely on in planning a transaction and 
may accordingly be used to evaluate the risk that the claimed tax 
benefit will be heavily scrutinized. In the end, this analysis is useful 
not only for resolving the current circuit split regarding the 
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the problem of accurately assessing objective economic substance 
while preserving taxpayer certainty. 
Jesse P. Houchens* 
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APPENDIX 
Diagram A. In Bank of New York Mellon, the Tax Court used the 




 †. Bank of N.Y. Mellon Corp. v. Comm’r, 140 T.C. 15, 20 (2013), aff’d, 801 F.3d 104 (2d 
Cir. 2015). 
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Diagram B.  Knoll provides the following table, summarizing his 




 ‡. Knoll supra note 22, at 840.  
